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Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut 
Ellen S. Podgor 
When one looks to accomplish consistency and predictability 
in the criminal justice system—important goals tied to achieving 
deterrence—the architecture of obstruction of justice remains 
important. It is insufficient to suggest that we have consistency 
in sentencing by using federal sentencing guidelines, when the 
charging process is undermined by its failure to provide 
uniformity. Achieving a consistent charging framework for 
federal obstruction of justice needs to be individualized, remain 
true to the contextual setting, and provide consideration for the 
specific processes of a trial, sentencing, or impeachment. But it 
also needs to have a structure that is not rearranged dependent 
upon the Attorney General, United States Attorney, the politics 
of the time, or varying interpretations of government officials.  
This Article examines obstruction of justice in the federal 
system, looking at it in three different contexts: as a criminal 
offense, as a sentencing enhancement, and as a basis for a judicial 
or presidential impeachment. It provides a comprehensive picture 
of the elements of obstruction of justice crimes, the challenges 
brought to courts, and the constituencies handling these matters. 
It focuses on the prosecutorial practices in bringing obstruction 
charges in federal court including its use as a “short-cut” offense 
that is easily proved in some contexts, while noting the difference 
in other arenas, such as impeachment inquiries. Like its practice 
regarding false statements and perjury, and unlike that for 
corporate criminal liability, the Department of Justice offers little 
internal guidance when selecting obstruction of justice crimes  
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as the basis for a criminal prosecution. The actual practice,  
as recently seen in the differing view of Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller and Attorney General William Barr in examining the 
allegations of obstruction conduct by President Donald Trump—
outlined in the Mueller Report—highlights the inconsistency in 
this area of the law. This Article provides an empirical and 
diagnostic lens to study the law and practice of whether federal 
obstruction of justice crimes require an underlying criminal 
offense or, alternatively, can be prosecuted as a sole charge or in 
conjunction with other shortcut offenses such as false statements 
and perjury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Obstruction of Justice arises in three different contexts in the 
federal system.1 It can be a: 1) federal crime;2 2) sentencing 
enhancement;3 or 3) basis for an impeachment, most recently seen 
as the basis for a presidential impeachment.4 As a federal offense,5 
it is premised upon one of the statutes found in the federal code, 
statutes primarily located in chapter 73 (Obstruction of Justice) of 
Title 18.6 As a sentencing enhancement or impeachment offense it 
may not be aligned with the statutory criminal structure or 
restricted by the elements designated in these criminal laws, 
although there are differing views on the latter.7  
The legal process and decisionmakers also differ for these three 
forms of obstruction of justice. As a federal criminal prosecution, 
the initial determination rests with the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and its accompanying United States Attorneys’ Offices. After all, it 
is the government that decides who will be prosecuted and for 
which charges.8 Although both a jury and/or judge are influential 
 
 1. It can be argued that witnesses who are held in contempt are yet another example 
of obstruction conduct. The obstruction statute in its original form included contempt 
conduct. But that statute was eventually divided and placed in different parts of the U.S. 
Code. See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. Separate and apart from obstruction as a crime, the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines provide that obstruction conduct can increase a sentence. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); see also infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. Not discussed in this Article are the many state obstruction of justice crimes. See 
generally John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American Criminal 
Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49 (2004) (discussing the breadth of both federal and state obstruction of 
justice laws). 
 6. Obstruction of justice statutes are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. See infra  
Section I.B.1–2. 
 7. Professor Alan Dershowitz argued for the violation of a specific crime as needed 
for an impeachment conviction on President Trump’s Impeachment Article related to abuse 
of power. See infra notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 180 (2007) (discussing discretionary prosecutorial charging). 
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players in the process, their role is contingent upon the initial 
decision of the prosecutor to proceed with an obstruction charge.9 
In contrast, as a sentencing enhancement, the decision of increasing 
the sentence based on obstruction conduct may have been 
promoted by the probation officer, the government, or a judge. 
Finally, a more political posture is found in its use in impeachment 
trials, with the House of Representatives considering its use as an 
Article of Impeachment and the Senate next considering its viability 
as a “high crime or misdemeanor.”10 But the lines in consideration 
of the elements of obstruction of justice, the players or 
constituencies making the decision, and the criteria for that 
decision oftentimes overlap in the sentencing and impeachment 
realm. For example, Special Prosecutor Robert S. Mueller and 
Attorney General William Barr considered the applicable 
obstruction statutes for their review of presidential conduct, albeit 
with differing perspectives.11  
In addition to the differing context and process used for 
obstruction conduct, a wide swath of individuals may be accused 
here, as one sees obstruction charges against those in the organized 
crime world,12 white collar offenders,13 corporate entities,14 as well 
as presidents of the United States. For example, the former 
accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP,15 celebrity Martha 
 
 9. The prosecutor’s role is heightened by the fact that 97.4% of the cases employ 
pleas. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl. 11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2018. 
 10. See infra notes 241–59 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum from Bill Barr 
to Deputy Att’y Gen. Rod Rosenstein & Assistant Att’y Gen. Steve Engel, Mueller’s 
“Obstruction” Theory (June 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/12/June-2018-Barr-Memo-to-DOJ-Muellers-Obstruction-Theory-1.2.pdf (offering the 
thoughts of Bill Barr, prior to his becoming Attorney General, on the executive function 
encompassed within presidential powers). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing organized 
crime family member charged with obstruction of justice); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296 
(2d Cir. 2006) (discussing a Gambino Family member charged with obstruction of justice 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)). 
 13. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming Martha Stewart’s 
conviction for obstructing an agency proceeding, in addition to other criminal offenses). 
 14. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (reversing an 
obstruction of justice conviction against the company). 
 15. Id. 
PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/20  8:29 PM 
661 Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut 
 661 
 
Stewart,16 and baseball player Barry Bonds,17 all were indicted on 
charges of obstruction of justice, although two of these cases were 
overturned by an appellate tribunal.18 One also sees a wide array of 
conduct constituting obstruction of justice, including threatening 
potential witnesses, retaliating against witnesses who testify, 
destruction of documents, and false statements that impede the due 
administration of justice. The victims of the alleged criminal 
activity can also differ, as they may include individuals specifically 
targeted by the perpetrator, stockholders of a corporate entity, as 
well as members of the public generally when there is an allegation 
of an unfair election.  
Thus, when one looks to accomplish consistency and 
predictability in the criminal justice system—important goals tied 
to achieving deterrence19—the architecture of obstruction of justice 
remains important. It is insufficient to suggest that the sentencing 
guidelines lead to consistent sentencing when the charging process 
itself lacks uniformity. Achieving a consistent charging framework 
for obstruction of justice needs to be individualized, remain true to 
the contextual setting, and provide consideration for the specific 
processes of a trial, sentencing, or impeachment. But it also needs 
to have a structure that is not rearranged dependent upon the 
United States Attorney, the politics of the time, or the 
interpretations of government officials. 
Part I of this Article examines the landscape of obstruction of 
justice, looking at its roots, its expansion over time, and its current 
applications. It synthesizes the vast literature on obstruction of 
justice, including the elements of the various crimes and the 
challenges considered by courts throughout the life of the key 
obstruction statutes.20  
Part II moves from the legal framework to examine 
prosecutorial practices in the federal system of charging 
obstruction of justice.21 It provides important data on the use of 
obstruction of justice as a sole offense or coupled with other 
 
 16. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 289. 
 17. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 18. The obstruction convictions in the Barry Bonds and Arthur Andersen LLP cases 
were overturned on appeal. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 708; Bonds, 784 F.3d at 590. 
 19. See infra notes 248–62 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 27–124 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 125–85 and accompanying text. 
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charges, and how its use has changed from its historical roots. 
Noted here is the role of obstruction as a “shortcut” offense by 
prosecutors to easily proceed against perpetrators of crimes 
without the need for complicated investigations and trials.22  
Like perjury and false statements, obstruction becomes an easily 
accessible crime in both the organized crime and white-collar 
worlds. But it is also noted here how solo obstruction charges, 
without prosecution of the underlying offense, occur routinely in 
federal prosecutions. It reflects on the unbridled discretion 
permitted of prosecutors when considering alleged obstruction 
conduct—discretion that has resulted in prosecutorial stretching of 
the statute in some instances and a failure to find conduct subject 
to criminal prosecution in other instances.23   
Part III focuses on the use of obstruction as a sentencing 
enhancement, noting the differences from its use as a criminal 
offense.24 Part IV then considers obstruction of justice in the 
impeachment realm.25 It does not delve into the quagmire of what 
constitutes a “high crime or misdemeanor” but rather notes the 
distinguishing factors in the process between a criminal trial’s 
evaluation of obstruction of justice and that done in the House and 
Senate in the impeachment process.  
This Article concludes by not only noting the importance of a 
predictable approach to obstruction of justice, but by offering a 
strategy for rectifying the current inconsistencies in federal criminal 
law.26 A haphazard use of prosecutorial discretion in bringing 
obstruction charges diminishes its ability to motivate deterrence. 
Increasing transparency on obstruction of justice charging practices 
will allow for heightened accountability and provide a way to 
assure consistency and predictability with a crime that is the 




 22. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 (2018) 
(discussing the government use of charges such as perjury, false statements, and obstruction 
of justice as “shortcut” offenses because they are more easily proved at trial than a 
complicated financial or white collar case); see also Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: 
Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2009) (discussing “process crimes”). 
 23. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 186–213 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 214–59 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 260–73 and accompanying text. 
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I. LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION 
PROSECUTIONS 
A. Historical Development—The Peck-Lawless Debacle 
The initial federal obstruction of justice statute came as  
an outgrowth of the impeachment trial of a judge following his 
issuing of a contempt ruling against a lawyer representing 
Louisiana landowners.27 Judge James H. Peck, a federal district 
court judge in Missouri, issued a court decision pertaining to 
Louisiana land disputes in an opinion that went against clients of 
Attorney Lake E. Lawless. Attorney Lawless responded by 
authoring a newspaper article that was critical of the judge. Judge 
Peck believed this article was inaccurate and prejudicial to the 
judicial system, especially since Attorney Lawless had remaining 
cases in Judge Peck’s court. An argument was also made that  
the article might have been designed to intimidate the judge in 
these remaining cases. Judge Peck held Attorney Lawless in 
contempt for his publication of this article that was critical of his 
judicial decision.28 
Judge Peck’s contempt finding against Attorney Lawless 
became the subject of an impeachment action that was filed against 
the judge.29 The sole offense charged in the Peck Impeachment was 
that the judge had Attorney Lawless arrested for contempt of court, 
brought into custody by a Marshal, and imprisoned for twenty-four 
hours. Judge Peck also suspended Lawless’ license to practice law 
for eighteen months.30 Issues of freedom of the press, scope of 
contempt powers, and the court’s supervisory power were some of 
 
 27. See Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the United States: 
Since the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 525, 531 (1928) [hereinafter Nelles & 
King, Since the Federal Contempt Statute] (examining the passage of the federal contempt 
statute following the Peck-Lawless controversy). 
 28. Judge Peck sentenced him to one day imprisonment and suspended him from the 
practice of law for eighteen months. See Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by 
Publication in the United States: To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 429 
(1928) [hereinafter Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute]. 
 29. See Washington, April 24, BURLINGTON WKLY. FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.),  
May 7, 1830, at 2 (discussing the hearings for impeachment in the House of Representatives 
and the vote of “ayes 113” for impeachment). 
 30. See The Trial of Judge Peck, BURLINGTON WKLY. FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.),  
May 14, 1830, at 3 (discussing the articles of impeachment and the managers’ issuance of the 
articles to the Senate). 
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the considerations in this impeachment action. The trial of Judge 
Peck was considered “tedious and expensive,” but reports at this 
time also called it “necessary and proper.” As noted in one news 
reporting, “Mr. Lawless may have deserved punishment—but the 
manner of its infliction is not conformable to our notions of right.”31  
In the end, the judge was acquitted in the Senate by a  
single vote.32 The unusual circumstances of the case and the 
predicament that Judge Peck was placed in proved to be a factor in 
this acquittal.33 
The legislature, however, overseeing the impeachment trial of 
Judge Peck, did recognize the need to clarify the contempt law. At 
the time of the impeachment hearing, section 17 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 allowed courts “to punish by fine or imprisonment . . . all 
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” 
But the issue was whether this statute covered alleged contempt 
conduct that occurred outside of the courtroom. Further 
complicating this situation were the legal implications of when the 
alleged contemptuous conduct involved something published, as 
was the case in the Lawless-Peck controversy.34 The failure of the 
1789 Judiciary Act to explain the contours of contempt, and 
whether it included this form of conduct, was the direct impetus of 
the initial federal obstruction statute. 
Following the impeachment of Judge Peck, Congress passed the 
Act of March 2, 1831,35 that provided in section 1 power for judges 
to issue a summary contempt of court for in-court misconduct and 
 
 31. See Judge Peck, ARK. GAZETTE (Ark. Post, Ark.), Mar. 16, 1831, at 2. 
 32. See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 978 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the 
history of § 1503 of the federal criminal code). 
 33. Judge Peck, supra note 31 (noting that the Judge’s action may have been “excusable, 
because of some peculiar condition in which he was placed[,] concerning which we have 
heard many rumors, years ago—though not personally applicable to the principal accuser, 
Mr. Lawless”). 
 34. See Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 28, at 422 (noting  
that “[t]wo inferior Federal courts” found that the statute allowed for punishment of out of 
court conduct). 
 35. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487–88. Professor Walter Nelles and Attorney 
Carol Weiss King traced the motivations for this statute in their two 1928 articles, noting 
initially how there were controversies arising in state courts in Pennsylvania and New York, 
but that the Peck-Lawless impeachment hearing was the eventual cause of the codification 
of the statute. See Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 28, at 409–30 
(discussing the use of contempt for the production and dissemination of a publication); 
Nelles & King, Since the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 27, at 423–31 (examining the 
passage of the federal contempt statute as a result of the Peck-Lawless controversy). 
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in section 2 a law to punish individuals both for in-court and out-
of-court obstructions that were against the “due administration of 
justice.”36 It is section 2 that mirrors the language used in today’s 
original obstruction of justice statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 
In 1948, these two provisions were split into two distinct 
offenses. Thus, currently there is 18 U.S.C. § 40137 for courtroom or 
nearby contempt conduct and § 150338 for conduct outside the 
courtroom.39 Since its enactment, there have been several 
 
 36. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487–88. It was believed that § 2 was needed to 
cover obstruction conduct not provided for in § 1. 
37. The current statute provides: 
A court . . . shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as— 
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
18 U.S.C. § 401. 
38. The current statute provides: 
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit 
juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be 
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States 
magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or 
injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any 
verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been 
such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing 
magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official 
duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection 
with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the 
threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment 
which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise 
provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any 
offense charged in such case. 
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is— 
(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112; 
(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed 
against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment 
for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and 
(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this 
title, or both. 
Id. § 1503. 
 39. See generally ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING, JEROLD H. ISRAEL &  
NANCY J. KING, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 169 (2d ed. 2018) (providing an overview of § 1503). 
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modifications to the obstruction of justice statute in § 1503, but for 
the most part it has remained constant in its terminology and 
requirements.40 The most significant change has been an increased 
penalty for violation of the offense.41 Today § 1503 serves as a 
central obstruction statute in the framework of other later federal 
obstruction laws.  
B. Statutory Base 
Prior to examining prosecutorial discretion in proceeding with 
an obstruction charge, it is important to consider the outer limits of 
what is considered criminality by the explicit language in the 
statute. But it is also necessary to see how prosecutors may 
sometimes stretch these statutes to prosecute what they consider to 
be egregious conduct. In this regard we see the courts providing 
guidance to reign in prosecutorial abuses.42 Thus the obstruction 
statutes, followed by judicial interpretation, are considered next.  
1. The statutory framework 
Today in chapter 73 of the criminal code (Title 18), there are 
twenty-two different obstruction of justice related statutes.43 
Although other obstruction of justice statutes exist within the 
federal code, such as in the tax code,44 nineteen of the statutes in 
 
 40. In 1982 the statute was amended to cover witnesses. See Act of Oct. 12, 1982,  
Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 4(c)(1)–(3), 96 Stat. 1253. In 1994 amendments included an increased 
penalty, use of the term magistrate judge instead of commissioner, and the addition of 
subsection (b), which designates penalties for killing, attempted killing, and imprisonment 
for other obstruction conduct. See Act of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, title VI, § 60016, 
title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(K), 108 Stat. 1974, 2147. Finally, in 1994 the statute was amended, 
adding an increased possible term if the obstruction conduct related to a criminal case that 
involved the threat or use of physical force. See Act of Oct. 1, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-214, § 1(3), 
110 Stat. 3017. 
 41. Currently it is possible to receive the death penalty for obstruction conduct 
resulting in a killing. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503; 18 U.S.C. § 1111. 
 42. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, “What Kind of a Mad Prosecutor” Brought Us This White 
Collar Case, 41 VT. L. REV. 523 (2017) (discussing cases where the Court reigned in prosecutors 
who stretched statutes to cover conduct that was beyond the statutory language or content). 
 43. The statutes can be found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. The reason for twenty-two 
statutes as opposed to twenty-one is that in addition to 18 U.S.C. § 1514, there is also  
18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 44. For example, the tax code (Title 26) has an obstruction statute that criminalizes 
conduct that “in any . . . way corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstructs or impedes, 
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chapter 73 are at the heart of obstruction of justice criminal 
prosecutions. The remaining three statutes in the twenty-two 
federal statutes include two focused on civil conduct and one that 
serves as a definition of terms used in other obstruction statutes. 
The key focus of many of the criminal-related statutes is the 
protection of government and court proceedings.  
Some of the statutes are narrowly tailored to protect specific 
government proceedings,45 such as legislative bodies and 
agencies.46 One also finds statutes criminalizing obstruction that 
occurs in specific types of investigation, such as obstruction of a 
criminal investigation of health care offenses,47 destruction, 
alteration, or falsification of records in a federal investigation,48 and 
destruction of corporate audit records.49 Conduct that may not fit 
within the generic obstruction of justice conduct in § 1503 may be 
prosecuted using these other obstruction statutes.50 
In 1982, Congress added two key statutes as part of the Victim 
and Witness Protection Act, §§ 1512 and 1513, that focused on 
 
or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.” 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). 
This tax statute does not require a proceeding or investigation for a prosecution, and a 
broader range of conduct is prohibited here as the Internal Revenue Service “duly 
administer[s] the tax laws even before initiating a proceeding.” United States v. Westbrooks, 
858 F.3d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 (10th 
Cir. 2015)); see also John A. Townsend, Tax Obstruction Crimes: Is Making the IRS’s Job Harder 
Enough?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 260 (2009) (analyzing tax crimes). 
 45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (prohibiting assault on a process server); 18 U.S.C. § 1502 
(resistance to an extradition agent); 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (influencing a juror through a writing); 
18 U.S.C. § 1506 (theft or alteration of a record or process); 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (picketing, 
parading, using sound equipment, or demonstrating in or near a courthouse or “a building 
or residence occupied or used by such judge, juror, witness, or court officer”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1508 (“[r]ecording, listening to, or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while 
[they are] deliberating or voting”); 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (obstruction relating to court orders);  
18 U.S.C. § 1510 (obstruction relating to criminal investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (obstruction 
pertaining to state and local law enforcement); 18 U.S.C. § 1521 (retaliating against a federal 
judge or federal law enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title). 
 46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (obstruction relating to proceedings before departments, 
agencies, and committees). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1518. 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 1520. 
 50. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1516 allows for the prosecution of federal audit and 
prohibits conduct that obstructs the “[f]ederal auditor in the performance of official duties 
relating to a person, entity, or program receiving in excess of $100,000, directly or indirectly, 
from the United States in any 1 year period.” 
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obstructions involving witnesses.51 These heavily used statutes 
allow the government to avoid proceeding using the more open-
ended language of “due administration of justice” found in § 1503,52 
and focus instead on conduct involving tampering with a witness, 
victim, or informant,53 or conduct involving retaliating against a 
witness, victim, or informant.54 These witness tampering statutes 
are used in a wide array of cases including those pertaining to 
violent street crimes as well as white collar economic crimes. Of 
recent vintage is a newer retaliation statute that criminalizes 
“retaliating against a [f]ederal judge or [f]ederal law enforcement 
officer by false claim or slander title.”55 
In addition to these nineteen criminal statutes, there are two 
statutes that concern civil remedies: one that provides for the 
government to obtain a civil remedy to restrain harassment of a 
victim or witness,56 and another for a civil action to protect 
whistleblowers who are employees of publicly traded companies 
when they come forward to assist in a fraud investigation.57 
Individuals who are retaliated against have protection in § 1514A, 
which allows an individual to file a complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor and bring a civil action in court for relief from this form  
of retaliation.58   
The obstruction statutes in chapter 73 also include a definition 
statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1515, which provides definitions for terms 
used in other obstruction statutes.59 For example, it provides a 
definition for what will be considered an “official proceeding”60 
and that the term “corruptly” as used in one statute means “acting 
with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, 
including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, 
concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other 
 
 51. See generally PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 181–85 (discussing the obstruction of 
justice statutes found in §§ 1512 and 1513). 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1512. 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1513. 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 1521. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 1514. 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 1514. 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 1515. 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1). The definition is limited to the obstruction statutes found in 
§§ 1512 and 1513. 
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information.”61 This statute also specifies that the obstruction 
statutes in this chapter do “not prohibit or punish the providing of 
lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with 
or anticipation of an official proceeding.”62 This provision offers an 
important protection to attorneys in their lawful representation  
of clients.63 
2.  Elements of the crime 
As one might suspect, the elements necessary for proof of an 
obstruction crime are dependent upon the specific obstruction 
statute being used by the prosecutor.64 That said, there are certain 
generic elements that are encompassed in the key obstruction 
statutes, although the list may be controversial. For example, as 
discussed in greater detail below, the Report on the Investigation into 
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Mueller Report) 
used three basic elements as “common to most of the relevant 
obstruction statutes: (1) an obstructive act; (2) a nexus between the 
obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt 
intent.”65 In contrast, the prosecution of baseball player Barry 
Bonds required an element of “materiality.” Irrespective of how 
one lists the elements of these crimes, there is strong consensus that 
obstruction operates as an “attempt” crime, as the statutes use the 
term “endeavored.”66 
In reflecting on the elements of obstruction of justice under 
§ 1503, one can dissect the “due administration of justice” element 
of this generic obstruction statute to include three factors. These 
are: “1) a pending proceeding; 2) that the accused knew or had 
 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). This definition is limited to interpreting § 1505. 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c). 
 63. See Laina Lopez, Defending Attorneys Charged with Obstruction Under the US Code, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2013, at 31, 32 (discussing the charging of an attorney with obstruction  
of justice). 
 64. See generally Sean Lavin, Julia Bell, MaeAnn Dunker & Mitchell McBride, 
Obstruction of Justice, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201 (2019) (discussing the elements of the 
different obstruction crimes). 
 65. 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE 
IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT VOL. II] 
(referencing the elements for 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, and 1512(c)(2)). 
 66. See infra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
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notice of, and [;] 3) that the accused intended to influence, obstruct, 
or impede its administration.”67  
3. Judicial oversight 
a.  Generally. Throughout the years there have been many 
different arguments raised during obstruction of justice 
prosecutions that require judicial interpretation.68 These include the 
applicable mens rea required to meet the statute and what will 
constitute a “corrupt intent.”69 These issues can raise constitutional 
dilemmas when the individual accused of the obstruction crime is 
an attorney and the alleged conduct is part of his or her 
representation of a client. Courts have also struggled with whether 
issues of obstruction are issues of law or fact, an important 
consideration in who will decide the question.70 The generic 
obstruction of justice statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 includes 
obstructions that arise from both acts occurring in criminal as well 
as civil proceedings.71  
Likewise, interpreting the term “endeavor” has produced 
significant caselaw.72 Courts have looked at questions of how much 
of an attempt is needed to satisfy this element. Courts have also 
considered what will constitute a pending proceeding for 
influencing, obstructing, or impeding its administration. One sees 
an overlap with false statements and perjury73 when the accused is 
 
 67. PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 171. 
 68. See also Ralf Willer, Hiding a Cartel’s Traces—A Criminal Offence? A Comparative 
Review of Liability for Obstruction of Justice Under German, French and US Law, 10 COMPETITION 
L. INT’L 179 (2014) (providing a comparative law review of obstruction of justice).  
See generally Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle,  
82 MICH. L. REV. 90 (1983) (discussing issues related to venue in obstruction of justice cases). 
 69. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 70. Typically, determining if the accused acted corruptly will be a fact question for the 
jury to decide. See United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978). But see  
United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding these questions to be mixed 
questions of law and fact). 
 71. See Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The obstruction of 
justice statute is broad enough to cover the attempted corruption of a prospective witness in 
a civil action in a Federal District Court.”). 
 72. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 73. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Perjury by Omission, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 265 (2019) 
(discussing a flaw in the current perjury statute). 
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charged with an obstruction of the due administration of justice 
and conduct involves perjurious or false statements.74 
 The Supreme Court has also tackled issues of the “nexus” 
needed between the obstruction conduct and the due 
administration of justice.75 Here again, the specific obstruction 
statute may complicate this consideration. Coupled with this 
question may be whether materiality is a component of the 
obstruction crime.   
Finally, defendants on occasion have raised the government’s 
use of the generic obstruction statute § 1503 when specific 
obstruction statutes were passed by the legislature to address the 
criminality.76 The classic example seen here is when the 
government charges the accused under § 1503 with conduct that 
could easily fit the elements of witness intimidation under §§ 1512 
and 1513.77 The government’s choice of the older generic statute for 
a prosecution has typically been upheld as within the ambit of 
prosecutorial charging prerogatives.78  
 
 74. See Decker, supra note 5, at 61–63 (discussing the use of false testimony  
as obstruction). 
 75. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text. 
 76. See United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that the legislature’s removal of witnesses from § 1503 should be 
indicative that witness tampering can only be charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–13).  
When Congress amended § 1512 in 1988, Senator Biden stated that the new legislation was: 
intended . . . merely to include in section 1512 the same protection of witnesses 
from non-coercive influence that was (and is) found in section 1503. It would permit 
prosecution of such conduct in the Second Circuit, where it is not now permitted, 
and would allow such prosecutions in other circuits to be brought under 
section 1512 rather than under the catch-all provision of section 1503. 
United States v. LeMoure, 474 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17,  
369 (1988)). 
 77. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and § 1512 
is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause 
of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself. It hardly leads to the conclusion that § 1503 
was, to the extent of the overlap, silently repealed.”). 
 78. See, e.g., LeMoure, 474 F.3d at 40–41 (finding no ban in using § 1503 even when the 
conduct may fit under the newer witness tampering provisions); United States v. Tackett, 
113 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1997) (same). The government’s argument to claims that prosecutions 
should be required to use §§ 1512 or 1513 when the conduct involves witness obstruction is 
that there is “nothing in the legislative history expressly indicating that Congress intended 
to contract the purview of the omnibus clause.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL § 1724 (2020) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 14–22, 27–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520–28, 2533–35; 128 CONG. REC. H8203-05 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) 
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b.  Mens rea. Whether the accused acted with a “corrupt” intent 
has been a key focus in analyzing the appellate decisions with 
convictions under various obstruction of justice statutes. In this 
regard, acting corruptly is not confined to one definition or set of 
specific conduct. Some court opinions reflect on whether there is 
specific proof of an intent to act “corruptly”79 while other courts do 
not require an evil motive.80 When examining the specific act to 
determine if the conduct was corrupt, courts have found conduct 
of bribery,81 destruction of documents,82 and fraudulent acts83 to 
satisfy this element of the crime. The controversy in considering 
this question is seen when comparing the Mueller Report on the 
alleged obstruction acts by President Trump, followed by Attorney 
General Barr’s decision that the conduct was not conducted with a 
corrupt intent.84 
c.  Endeavor. As previously noted, the generic obstruction of 
justice statute, § 1503, as well as some of the other obstruction 
statutes, do not require a completion of the crime. The term 
“endeavor” in the statute allows it to encompass attempt acts. A 
defense that the obstruction was thwarted or impossible to 
complete will not serve as a defense to the crime.85 Although the 
use of the term “endeavor” is similar to attempt conduct, it does not 
require proof of the elements necessary for attempt crimes. Thus, 
 
(section-by-section analysis of H.R. 7191)), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-
resource-manual-1724-protection-government-processes-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1503. 
 79. See United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding insufficient 
evidence of a corrupt motive). 
 80. See United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that attempting to 
influence a juror is per se an unlawful corrupt act). 
 81. See United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding that telling 
someone to bribe a juror is a corrupt endeavor for obstruction). 
 82. See generally Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 
Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (1992) (advocating for a Model Penal Code approach in interpreting the 
mens rea element of obstruction of justice). 
 83. United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1941) (finding a fraudulent act 
sufficient in meeting the obstruction statute). 
 84. See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
 85. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (noting that the use of the 
word “endeavor” in the statute does not require success in accomplishing the corruption 
act); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that it is not “required 
that the attempted obstruction be successful”); United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the impossibility to accomplish the obstruction of the 
administration of justice does not preclude a conviction). 
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proof of the accused having taken a “substantial step” to 
completion of the crime is not required. It operates comparable to a 
solicitation type of crime.86  
d. The Due Administration of Justice. As noted, the components 
of the “due administration of justice” element are: “1) a pending 
proceeding; 2) that the accused knew or had notice of[;] and 3) that 
the accused intended to influence, obstruct, or impede its 
administration.”87 Courts have included grand jury, trial, and 
appellate proceedings as within the “pending proceeding” 
language.88 Although § 1503, the generic obstruction statute, does 
not cover proceedings before agencies or legislative bodies, other 
statutes do cover this conduct.89   
The necessity for a “pending proceeding” has been met when 
the conduct involved the accused speaking to a probation officer in 
anticipation of sentencing.90 But if there is no evidence that a grand 
jury is pending, it may not suffice for meeting the requirement of a 
pending proceeding.91 Where some courts hold that “the acts 
complained of must bear a reasonable relationship to the subject of 
the grand jury inquiry,”92 other courts reject this approach.93  
The accused also needs to know of the pending proceedings. 
Requiring a mens rea for the pending proceeding aspect of the 
statute was solidified in the Supreme Court decision of Pettibone v. 
United States,94 although an older statute was used in this particular 
case. Newer cases have equated this element with the nexus 
 
 86. See United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 940 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 87. See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 170. 
 88. Although appeals are covered as a pending proceeding, when the time for filing 
the appeal had expired, it was held not to be within the scope of a pending proceeding.  
See United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an appeal was no 
longer a pending proceeding once the appellate clock had run). 
 89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (governing “[o]bstruction of proceedings before departments, 
agencies, and committees”). 
 90. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding it 
was immaterial whether complaint was filed minutes after the interview instead of minutes 
before the interview). 
 91. See United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 92. Id. at 734. 
 93. See United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1161 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 
government does not need to prove that the obstructive acts were relevant to the grand jury’s 
investigation). In a § 1505 case, the Tenth Circuit held that agency investigative activities 
were “proceedings” within the meaning of obstruction of “proceedings” before departments, 
agencies, or committees. See United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 94. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893). 
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requirement and in some instances required a direct knowledge of 
the pending proceeding. For example, in Marinello v. United States,95 
an obstruction case brought under a tax obstruction statute, the 
Supreme Court held that “[j]ust because a taxpayer knows that the 
IRS will review her tax return every year does not transform every 
violation of the Tax Code into an obstruction charge.”96  
So, although it may not be necessary to know that the proceeding 
is federal,97 it is necessary to know of the pending proceeding. 
The final aspect of the due administration of justice portion of 
the obstruction statute is the requirement to show an intent to 
influence, obstruct, or impede. Here again, evidence that may be 
used in an obstruction case may meet several different elements. 
The most noticeable exclusions here are instances when the grand 
jury or proceedings have ended and therefore cannot meet this 
element.98 That said, other obstruction statutes can be used to 
prosecute this conduct. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 prohibits 
“[r]etaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant.”99 
e.  Nexus. One of the more controversial elements of obstruction 
statutes has been the requirement of a “nexus,” which is provided 
by a link between a false statement and the obstruction of the due 
administration of justice.100 The “nexus” element proved to be a 
matter of concern in the criminal case against Judge Robert Aguilar, 
a United States District Court judge for the Northern District of 
California,101 and also in the prosecution of Arthur Andersen 
LLP,102 as well as in many other cases.  
Judge Aguilar’s case alleged his disclosure of a wiretap and 
obstruction of justice in providing a false statement to an 
investigating officer. He was convicted under a statute that made it 
illegal to disclose wiretap information, and also for a violation of 
the obstruction statute in § 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct the due 
 
 95. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 96. Id. at 1110. 
 97. See United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 98. See United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1992) (threatening jurors whose 
service has ended does not meet the obstruction statute). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 1513; see United States v. Bailey, 931 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming 
conviction on guilty plea for retaliating against a witness after a trial). 
 100. See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 177–78. 
 101. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
 102. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
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administration of justice.103 The Supreme Court affirmed the  
en banc Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the obstruction conviction.104 
The Court held that an “endeavor” to obstruct does not require 
that the act be successful. It is necessary, however, for the defendant 
to know that his or her acts would be used before a  
judicial proceeding. The Court stated, “if the defendant lacks 
knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial 
proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.”105 The Court 
noted that “[t]he Government did not show here that the agents 
acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had 
even summoned the testimony of these particular agents.”106 
The nexus requirement was also a key issue in the Arthur 
Andersen LLP107 case that was reversed by the Supreme Court.  
The company, which had been “Enron’s auditor, instructed its 
employees to destroy documents pursuant to its document 
retention policy.”108 Charged and found guilty of violating  
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A), the Supreme Court reviewed the jury 
instructions used in the case. The Court gave examples of the lack 
of culpability required by the instructions, including noting that 
“[t]he instructions also diluted the meaning of ‘corruptly’ so that  
it covered innocent conduct.”109 In reversing the conviction, the 
Court found the instructions improper because “[t]hey led the jury  
to believe that it did not have to find any nexus between  
the ‘persua[sion]’ to destroy documents and any  
particular proceeding.”110  
f.  Materiality. Materiality111 as an element of an obstruction of 
justice offense is not a clearly accepted principle. For one, the key 
 
 103. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 595. 
 104. Id. at 606. The en banc Ninth Circuit had reversed both convictions, but the 
Supreme Court, while affirming the decision on the obstruction count, reversed the wiretap 
conviction. Id. 
 105. Id. at 599. 
 106. Id. at 600. 
 107. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 707–08. 
 108. Id. at 698. 
 109. Id. at 706. 
 110. Id. at 707. 
 111. Materiality is typically defined as “ha[ving] a natural tendency to influence” 
although the object of the influence differs by the respective statute that requires materiality. 
See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 807–08 (1988) (examining materiality as it related 
to “[influencing] decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service”). 
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obstruction statutes do not include the word “materiality.” 
Likewise, older court decisions did not focus on materiality as a 
required element necessary for these offenses.112  
The Supreme Court spoke clearly in finding that a key false 
statement statute requires materiality,113 although it also found that 
a different false statement statute did not include a materiality 
element.114 The confusion as to when materiality is required is also 
seen in determining whether it is an element in prosecutions of 
fraud. Although the word “materiality” is not found in the classic 
criminal fraud statutes, like mail and wire fraud, the Court found it 
to be an element of these offenses. Using a common law approach, 
the Court held in Neder v. United States115 that “materiality of 
falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
bank fraud statutes.”116 
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the 
question of whether materiality is a required element in an 
obstruction case, an en banc Ninth Circuit decision did so. Celebrity 
baseball player Barry Bonds117 was questioned in front of a federal 
grand jury for approximately three hours on his “suspected use of 
steroids.”118 His testimony resulted in him being charged with four 
counts of making a false statement and one count of obstruction of 
justice. The obstruction was premised on his alleged false testimony 
before the grand jury.119 With the exception of being convicted on 
the obstruction count, the other charges resulted in a hung jury.120 
The Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction because there was 
“insufficient evidence” that the statement used by the prosecution 
as proof of an obstruction of justice under § 1503 was “material” to 
the grand jury investigation.  
 
 112. See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be 
an Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2005) (discussing how materiality 
was not being used as an element in obstruction cases and advocating for a change). 
 113. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (finding that the resolution of 
materiality was a question for the jury as opposed to the judge). 
 114. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) (finding that materiality was not an 
element of 18 U.S.C. § 1014). 
 115. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 116. Id. at 25. 
 117. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 118. Id. at 582. 
 119. Id. at 582–83. 
 120. Id. 
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The Bonds court was concerned about the breadth of the generic 
obstruction statute, stating that “[s]tretched to its limits, § 1503 
poses a significant hazard for everyone involved in our system of 
justice, because so much of what the adversary process calls for 
could be construed as obstruction.”121 It proved particularly 
problematic in this case where the alleged obstruction was a single 
statement which consisted of two questions and two answers to 
those questions.122 It was this statement alone that formed the basis 
of the alleged obstruction conduct. The Ninth Circuit held that 
“[m]ateriality screens out many of the statute’s troubling 
applications by limiting convictions to those situations where an act 
‘has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, 
the decision of the decisionmaking body.’”123 A concurring opinion 
noted that a “single truthful but evasive or misleading statement 
can never be material.”124  
In examining the elements specific to one obstruction of justice 
statute, it is important to note that the statutes in chapter 73 of Title 
18 do differ. What might be excluded under one statute may be 
allowed under another. The more specific statutes offer a greater 
range of conduct to be prosecuted while also maintaining the 
current breadth of the generic statute found in § 1503.  
II. PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES IN CHARGING OBSTRUCTION CRIMES 
A. Generally 
A long list of different forms of conduct has been the basis for 
an obstruction charge under § 1503, the founding obstruction 
statute. The Criminal Resource Manual that accompanies the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Justice Manual125 includes the following conduct as the 
basis of convictions under § 1503: “[e]ndeavoring to suborn 
perjury[,]” “[e]ndeavoring to influence a witness not to testify or to 
 
 121. Id. at 584. 
 122. Id. at 583. 
 123. Id. at 585 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)). In Kungys, the Court 
was considering materiality in connection with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
 124. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 589. 
 125. “The Justice Manual contains publicly available Department of Justice (DOJ) 
policies and procedures.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 1-1.100 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction. 
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make himself/herself unavailable to testify[,]” “[g]iving false 
denials of knowledge and memory, or evasive answers[,]” 
“[f]alsifying a report likely to be submitted to a grand jury[,]” 
“[d]estroying, altering, or concealing subpoenaed documents[,]” 
“[e]ndeavoring to sell grand jury transcripts[,]” “[o]ffering to sell a 
guarantee of a jury acquittal to a defense counsel[,]” “[e]ndeavoring 
to influence, through a third party, a judge[,]” “[d]eliberately 
concealing one’s identity thereby preventing a court from gathering 
information necessary to exercise its discretion in imposing a 
sentence[,]” “[o]btaining secret grand jury testimony[,]” 
“[s]ubmitting false or misleading information to the grand 
jury[,]”or “[r]efusing to testify before the grand jury.”126 The list 
grows even longer when one includes other obstruction statutes 
that include conduct before federal government agencies and the 
legislative body.  
Typically, oversight of the charging process is minimal and 
guidance may be limited to what is stated internally to government 
prosecutors.127 The Justice Manual provides general considerations 
for initiating and declining prosecution and the probable cause 
requirement necessary to bring charges.128 Key in commencing 
prosecution is the finding of a “federal offense [and having] 
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and 
sustain a conviction.”129 But it is noted that prosecution should be 
declined when (1) the prosecution would serve “no substantial 
 
 126. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 78, § 1724. 
 127. The Justice Manual (previously U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) provides as follows: 
Generally, obstruction of justice offenses fall under the supervisory responsibility 
of the Division and Section of the Department having responsibility for, or 
expertise in, the basic subject matter. For example, obstruction of an investigation 
into health care fraud would fall under the supervision of the Fraud Section of the 
Criminal Division; obstruction involving violence against a witness would fall 
under the supervision of the Gang Unit of the Criminal Division; obstruction of a 
gambling investigation would fall under the supervision of the Organized Crime 
and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division; and obstruction of a public 
corruption investigation or a congressional proceeding would fall under the 
supervision of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division. 
If such responsibility cannot be identified, supervisory responsibility rests with 
the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division. 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-69.100 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ 
usam/archives/usam-9-69000-protection-government-processes#9-69.100. 
 128. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.200 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
archives/usam/archives/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200. 
 129. Id. at § 9-27.220. 
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federal interest[;]” (2) the “person is subject to effective prosecution 
in another jurisdiction;” or (3) “there exists an adequate non-
criminal alternative to prosecution.”130 The Justice Manual specifies 
factors that are impermissible considerations, such as race, sexual 
orientation, and “the possible affect [sic] of the decision on the 
attorney’s own professional or personal circumstances.”131 One also 
finds guidance stating that one should charge the most serious 
offense and that each U.S. Attorneys’ Office should create internal 
office policies in order to have a charging review process.132 This 
guidance is minimal in comparison to the more detailed guidance 
provided to prosecutors who are considering proceeding against 
corporations. Corporate guidelines tell prosecutors to use the 
individual guidance provided, but then note that “due to the nature 
of the corporate ‘person,’ some additional factors are present.”133 
These include factors such as the “corporation’s timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing[,]” the “pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the corporation[,]”134 and their cooperation in 
the prosecution of individuals.135 Throughout the years, different 
Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General have issued 
 
 130. Id. Later sections of the Justice Manual (U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) provide “relevant 
considerations” for substantial federal interest as well as guidance for other reasons  
for declining prosecution, such as a prosecution in another jurisdiction. Id. at §§ 9-27.230 
to 9-27.250. 
 131. Id. at § 9-27.260. 
 132. Id. at § 9-27.300. The Justice Manual states: 
To ensure consistency and accountability, charging and plea agreement decisions 
must be reviewed by a supervisory attorney. All but the most routine indictments 
should be accompanied by a prosecution memorandum that identifies the 
charging options supported by the evidence and the law and explains the charging 
decision therein. Each United States Attorney’s Office and litigating division of the 
Department is required to promulgate written guidance describing its internal 
indictment review process. 
Id. 
 133. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.300 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/archives/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-
prosecution-business-organizations. 
 134. Id. A key consideration in recent years is corporate cooperation. In discussing the 
value of cooperation, the Justice Manual states, “[i]n order for a company to receive any 
consideration for cooperation under this section, the company must identify all individuals 
substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their 
position, status or seniority, and provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to that 
misconduct.” Id. at § 9-28.700. 
 135. Id. 
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memos to instruct Assistant United States Attorneys on how to 
handle corporate investigations and charging.136  
Use of obstruction of justice is referenced here as a  
“short-cut”137 offense because this crime allows prosecutors to 
charge the conduct without needing to present to a jury a 
complicated case. This can be particularly important in white collar 
cases where there might have been a lengthy investigation, 
significant financial data, and a need for a jury to understand an 
intricate fraudulent transaction. Instead, charging perjury, false 
statements, or obstruction of justice bypasses the need to explain 
the transactions to the jury and provides a way to secure a 
conviction by proving the accused lied to federal officers, a grand 
jury, an agency, or obstructed an investigation. It also allows some 
prosecutors to stack charges with the same conduct being charged 
as both false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice.138 
B. The Mueller Investigation & Response 
In the Mueller Report, Robert S. Mueller and his team examine 
ten alleged acts of President Donald J. Trump, considering them in 
conjunction with the elements of the federal criminal obstruction of 
justice statutes. The Mueller Report also provides an overview of 
 
 136. See Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual 
Accountability” in All the Wrong Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897 (2017) (discussing former 
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates’ corporate charging memorandum); Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (2009) (discussing former 
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson’s corporate charging memorandum); Lisa Kern 
Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 
316 (2007) (discussing the corporate charging memorandum of former Deputy Attorney 
Generals Thompson and McNulty). 
 137. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 1435 (2009) (discussing “process crimes”); Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up 
Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 9–13 (2005) (examining the government’s charging of cover-
up crimes); see also Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1137 (2004) 
(discussing “pretextual prosecutions” for charging individuals as opposed to focusing on the 
offense itself). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 
(2018) (analyzing the government’s use of “pretextual,” “process,” or just more easily proved 
crimes to assure a favorable jury resolution). 
 138. See Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal 
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN STATE L. REV. 1107 (2005) 
(discussing how prosecutors will charge the same conduct using multiple different crimes). 
Prosecutors also will tack on charges such as money laundering and conspiracy.  
See Teresa E. Adams, Note, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar Crimes: What 
Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 531 (2000) 
(discussing how prosecutors will add money laundering charges in white collar cases). 
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these ten acts and an additional cumulative consideration in the 
final section. Even if these acts do meet the elements of the 
applicable obstruction statutes, there is likewise a disparity in view 
as to whether this should be a basis for indictment or 
impeachment—as the statutes were being examined against the 
conduct of a sitting President.139 The Mueller Report notes that  
an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo found that a sitting 
president cannot be indicted, and notes that “this Office  
accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising 
prosecutorial jurisdiction.”140 
Further, although the Mueller Report provides extensive 
analysis for each of these ten separate instances that might be 
considered as obstruction of justice conduct,141 this activity did not 
form the basis of the two acts of impeachment later brought against 
President Trump. Instead, the articles of impeachment against 
President Trump centered on obstruction of justice, but it was the 
obstruction of the legislative body investigating his case that was 
the focus, not the alleged obstructive acts found in the Mueller 
Report. Thus, the Mueller Report, although referenced at various 
parts of the impeachment hearings and trial, did not serve as the 
basis for the impeachment against President Trump.  
Although the Mueller Report was not a basis for impeachment, 
it is important to examine this report and the reaction of Attorney 
General Barr, as it illuminates an approach to the use of obstruction 
of justice in his office and, some may conclude, the arbitrariness of 
its application.  
The Mueller Report is presented in two volumes. The first 
examines “Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election 
and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.”142 Volume Two, 
the focus of obstructive acts, “addresses the President’s actions 
towards the FBI’s investigation into Russia’s interference in the 
2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions 
 
 139. See generally Ediberto Roman, Melissa Gonzalez & Dianet Torres, Collusion, 
Obstruction of Justice, and Impeachment, 45 J. LEGIS. 9, 37–46 (2018) (discussing whether a sitting 
President can be criminally indicted). 
 140. MUELLER REPORT VOL. II, supra note 65, at 1. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE 
IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT VOL. I]. 
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towards the Special Counsel’s investigation.”143 The Mueller Report 
notes that his team did not make a “traditional prosecutorial 
judgment.”144 It notes that “[t]he conclusion that Congress may 
apply the obstruction laws to the President’s corrupt exercise of the 
powers of office accords with our constitutional system of checks 
and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.”145 
But the Mueller Report also notes that “if we had confidence after a 
thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not 
commit obstruction of justice, we would so state.”146 The executive 
summary of Volume II concludes: “Accordingly, while this report 
does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does 
not exonerate him.”147 
Prior to releasing the Mueller Report with some redactions, 
Attorney General William P. Barr issued a letter on March 24, 
2019,148 that references the obstruction allegations. The letter states:  
After reviewing the Special Counsel’s final report on these  
issues; consulting with Department officials, including the Office 
of Legal Counsel; and applying the principles of federal 
prosecution that guide our charging decisions, Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein and I have concluded that the evidence 
developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is not 
sufficient to establish that the President committed an 
obstruction-of-justice offense.149 
Despite the exhaustive evidence and specificity in the Mueller 
Report, Attorney General Barr found that 
 
 143. Id. at 3. 
 144. MUELLER REPORT VOL. II, supra note 65, at 8. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., to Lindsey Graham, Chairman for the  
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Jerrold Nadler, Chairman for the U.S. House of 
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member for the  
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Doug Collins, Ranking Member for the  
U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1147981/download. 
 149. Id. at 3. Attorney General Barr states that his determination was “made without 
regard to, and is not based on, the constitutional considerations that surround the indictment 
and criminal prosecution of a sitting president.” Id. (citing A Sitting President’s Amenability 
to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000)). 
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[i]n making this determination, we noted that the Special Counsel 
recognized that “the evidence does not establish that the 
President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian 
election interference,” and that, while not determinative, the 
absence of such evidence bears upon the President’s intent with 
respect to obstruction.150 
In his later remarks on April 18, 2019,151 Attorney General Barr 
noted that “[a]part from whether the acts were obstructive, this 
evidence of non-corrupt motives weighs heavily against any 
allegation that the President had a corrupt intent to obstruct the 
investigation.”152  
 
 150. Id. He further states: 
Generally speaking, to obtain and sustain an obstruction conviction, the 
government would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person, acting 
with corrupt intent, engaged in obstructive conduct with a sufficient nexus to a 
pending or contemplated proceeding. In cataloguing the President’s actions, many 
of which took place in public view, the report identifies no actions that, in our 
judgment, constitute obstructive conduct, had a nexus to a pending or 
contemplated proceeding, and were done with corrupt intent, each of which, 
under the Department’s principles of federal prosecution guiding charging 
decisions, would need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish an 
obstruction-of-justice offense.  
Id. 
 151. William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Remarks on the Release of the Report on the 
Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-
release-report-investigation-russian. 
 152. Id. Attorney General Barr stated: 
  After carefully reviewing the facts and legal theories outlined in the report, 
and in consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel and other Department 
lawyers, the Deputy Attorney General and I concluded that the evidence 
developed by the Special Counsel is not sufficient to establish that the President 
committed an obstruction-of-justice offense. 
  Although the Deputy Attorney General and I disagreed with some of the 
Special Counsel’s legal theories and felt that some of the episodes examined did 
not amount to obstruction as a matter of law, we did not rely solely on that in 
making our decision. Instead, we accepted the Special Counsel’s legal framework 
for purposes of our analysis and evaluated the evidence as presented by the 
Special Counsel in reaching our conclusion. 
  In assessing the President’s actions discussed in the report, it is important to 
bear in mind the context. President Trump faced an unprecedented situation. As 
he entered into office, and sought to perform his responsibilities as President, 
federal agents and prosecutors were scrutinizing his conduct before and after 
taking office, and the conduct of some of his associates. At the same time, there 
was relentless speculation in the news media about the President’s personal 
culpability. Yet, as he said from the beginning, there was in fact no collusion. And 
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Clearly, an exhaustive evaluation of the Mueller Report may 
present differing views on whether the conduct of President Trump 
met the elements of the crime of obstruction of justice.153 This 
Article’s examination is more nuanced in that the focus is on 
whether underlying conduct is a necessary component for a corrupt 
intent for purposes of a criminal obstruction case. In this regard, 
data provides observations that counter this contention.  
C. Empirical Analysis of Obstruction Charging Practices 
1. Generally 
The use of empirical data often comes with caveats, and this 
data is no exception. There is no accessible database that provides 
complete information on the charging of crimes by the government. 
Existing data does not offer information on cases where there were 
declinations of prosecutions. There also is no public database to 
scrutinize prosecutorial decisions not to include charges such as an 
obstruction of justice charge. Further, existing databases do not 
provide the pre-charge bargaining that can skew what may have 
been considered by prosecutors in selecting a charge of obstruction 
or deciding not to charge this conduct. In the early years of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, years in which the judiciary had little 
discretion to go outside the mandatory sentencing grid,154 pre-
 
as the Special Counsel’s report acknowledges, there is substantial evidence to 
show that the President was frustrated and angered by a sincere belief that the 
investigation was undermining his presidency, propelled by his political 
opponents, and fueled by illegal leaks. Nonetheless, the White House fully 
cooperated with the Special Counsel’s investigation, providing unfettered access 
to campaign and White House documents, directing senior aides to testify freely, 
and asserting no privilege claims. And at the same time, the President took no act 
that in fact deprived the Special Counsel of the documents and witnesses 
necessary to complete his investigation.  
Id. 
 153. See Charlie Savage, How Barr’s Excerpts Compare to the Mueller Report’s Findings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/politics/mueller-
report-william-barr-excerpts.html (discussing differences in Barr’s response to the Mueller 
Report and the Mueller Report itself). 
 154. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223 
(1993) (discussing the harshness of the sentencing guidelines). 
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charge bargaining was commonplace.155 Criminal defense 
attorneys would try to secure a plea agreement prior to their client’s 
indictment to minimize the repercussions of sentencing. Criminal 
defense attorneys still negotiate prior to charging, often to secure 
benefits such as a decrease in the sentence for “acceptance of 
responsibility”156 or receipt of a sentence reduction based on the 
government filing a 5K1.1 motion for the defendant’s cooperation 
and assistance to the government.157 
Noting the deficiencies in existing databases, there are still 
several remaining sources for consideration of actual charges of 
obstruction of justice. Three of those sources are used here.   
A first method is seen in the TRAC reporting system that 
includes separate numerical statistics for federal charging and 
convictions of crimes.158 TRAC Reports obtain applicable data from 
the Department of Justice and then provide comparisons and 
contrasts throughout the years, typically in five-year increments. 
The data, however, is limited to the lead charges, so cases with 
obstruction of justice counts may be omitted because they might 
not have been designated as lead charges by the Department  
of Justice.  
Second is the wealth of data accessible from the United States 
Sentencing Commission. Its available data provides information on 
cases that have included obstruction charges, including both the 
number of cases, the accompanying charges, and the sentences 
 
 155. See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial 
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013) 
(noting how pre-charge bargaining can be a limitation to observing sentencing disparities). 
 156. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1989).  
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a decrease in the offense level when a defendant 
“clearly demonstrates . . . acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” Id. 
 157. Id. § 5K1.1. Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allows prosecutors to 
file a motion “stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” Id. The court 
then decides the “appropriate reduction” taking into effect factors such as the “the nature 
and extent of the defendant’s assistance” and the timeliness of that assistance. Id. 
 158. “Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) is a data gathering, data 
research and data distribution organization at Syracuse University.” About Us, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2020). TRAC uses the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain 
Department of Justice data. Id. 
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received.159 Because many of the cases are resolved via a plea 
agreement, the data provides the widest range of information.  
A key deficiency in this data is that it is basically cold numbers 
without reference to specific cases, so that underlying issues cannot 
be discerned here. 
Finally, a third, more tedious method used is to examine all 
reported opinions that include an obstruction of justice statute as a 
basis for the charge or where the accused had an obstruction 
conviction. The information provided here is significantly more 
extensive in that it allows one to consider the underlying conduct 
used for the obstruction prosecution. But from another perspective 
the sample here is more limited, since most of the obstruction cases 
are resolved via plea agreements and thus are seldom the subject of 
a reported decision. With so many cases resolved through a plea 
agreement, the obstruction appellate issues in these decisions may 
focus on the plea, its voluntariness, or whether the accused’s 
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Pre-trial 
motions in obstruction cases, along with appellate decisions on 
convictions obtained after a trial, do offer some view of what the 
charging practices may have been.  
Thus, admittedly the data in the sections below is far  
from perfect. But the trends and observations with respect to 
charging obstruction without other offenses, or with only “shortcut 
crimes,” are apparent here and are a constant throughout this 
review process.  
 
 159. The easily accessible statistics of the U.S. Sentencing Commission report by type 
of crime as opposed to focusing just on obstruction offenses. Obstruction offenses come 
under Administration of Justice Offenses which include a wider range of conduct well 
beyond the statutes in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. The Commission states that Administration of 
Justice Offenses include “obstructing or impeding officers, contempt, obstruction of justice, 
perjury or subornation of perjury, bribery of a witness, impersonation, failure to appear by 
offender, failure to appear by material witness, commission of offense while on release, 
payment of witness, and misprision of a felony.” 2018 Annual Report and Sourcebook, U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N app. A (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/AppendixA.pdf. For fiscal year 
2018, there were a total of 730 offenses encompassed under the rubric of “administration of 
justice” of which 93.4% (682) were pleas and 6.6 % (48) were trials. Id. tbl.12, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table12.pdf. 
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2. Obstruction charging data 
The following chart was developed by using specific lead 
charge reports from TRAC. It demonstrates that there has been a 
decrease in the number of cases using obstruction of justice as the 
lead charge from cases twenty years ago, and that this decrease  





1999 2009 2014 2019 
18 U.S.C. § 1503 30 14 7 23 
18 U.S.C. § 1505 9 5 3 2 
18 U.S.C. § 1510 8 1 0 1 
18 U.S.C. § 1512 69 66 52 52 
18 U.S.C. § 1513 36 25 11 18 
All Federal 
Crimes Charged 
89,309 169,612 153,207 184,274 
Figure 1: Obstruction as Lead Charge160 
 
Just examining the charging of obstruction under the generic 
statute § 1503, it is apparent that the number of prosecutions using 
this statute as the lead charge is significantly decreased from 
twenty years ago. Although TRAC reports that there has been an 
increased number of charges in 2019,161 in this year it demonstrates 
a 36.7 percent decrease in § 1503 being the lead charge from twenty 
years ago.162 Attributing this decrease to the growth of the newer 
obstruction statutes found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1513 is not 
warranted, as one finds these two obstruction offenses have also 
experienced a decrease.  
These statistics do not, however, represent that there has been 
an overall decrease in the use of obstruction crimes—these numbers 
are merely limited to the Department of Justice’s representation of 
what is their lead charge in a case. This is relevant because the 
 
 160. This figure was produced by taking the data from each of the individual TRAC 
reports of specific statutes presented above. (The author can provide this data.) Reporting is 
initially in 5-year increments, but then goes to 10 years as seen above. 
 161. Figure 1 supra does not report on the difference from 2018 to 2019, but this 
percentage is provided in the TRAC Reports. (The author can provide this data.) 
 162. See supra Figure 1. 
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government designation of lead charge can show its emphasis on 
different areas of criminal activity. For example, one sees  
an increased number of drug and immigration offenses in the  
last few years,163 but many of these cases have also included 
obstruction charges.  
3. Obstruction sentencing data 
When one looks at sentencing data that does not designate the 
lead charge, a somewhat different picture emerges. Here it becomes 
apparent that the government is widely using obstruction charges 
and that many convictions include obstruction of justice crimes. It 
is also apparent that many of the convictions may be instances of 
sole convictions for obstruction conduct without convictions for 
any other crimes. The numbers below do not separate convictions 
premised upon pleas and trials, so it is possible that some of the 
obstruction convictions below resulted from a plea to an 
obstruction charge with an accompanying dismissal of other counts 
in an indictment. The columns of A1–A4 designate different 
obstruction crimes, while columns B, C, and D provide obstruction 
with other offenses. Convictions are only listed one time, so the 
numbers below represent separate cases and there are no cases that 








 163. Attorney Generals typically set their priorities upon entering the office.  
For example, Attorney General Barr stated that he “support[ed] the prosecutorial priorities 
that Attorney General Sessions put in place.” See William P. Barr, Att’y Gen.,  
Opening Remarks at the U.S. Attorney’s Conference (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-opening-
remarks-us-attorneys-conference. Those were “violent crime, drugs, immigration, and 
national security.” Id. Other Attorney Generals have had different priorities. For example, 
Attorney General Eric Holder had priorities that included “terrorism and other threats to 
national security,” violent crimes, financial fraud, and “protecting the most vulnerable 
members of our society” (e.g. elderly, victims of hate crimes). See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., 
Speech on the Department of Justice’s Priorities and Mission (Apr. 25, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-about-
thedepartment-justice-s-priorities-and-mission. 
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Date A1 A2 A3 A4 B C D  Total 
2004 16 9 53 15 12 7 86 198 
2009 14 5 77 32 8 9 125 270 
2014 13 4 69 25 12 12 135 270 
2018 9 5 66 24 6 9 103 222 
Figure 2: Sentencings with Obstruction Convictions164 
 
• A1: 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The sentences in this column are based on 
a violation of the generic obstruction statute, that is, one 
against the “due administration of justice.” It is the sole 
conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced, 
except for the caveat of accessories and conspiracies  
noted below. 
• A2: 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The sentences in this column are based on 
a violation of the statute “Obstruction of proceedings before 
departments, agencies, and committees.” It is the sole 
conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced, 
except for the caveat of accessories and conspiracies  
noted below. 
• A3: 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513. The sentences in this column 
show a combined number for violations of either of these two 
statutes that pertain to “Tampering with a witness, victim, or 
an informant,” and “Retaliating against a witness, victim, or 
an informant.” The number is limited to a sole conviction of 
one or both of these obstruction statutes upon which the 
defendant is being sentenced, except for the caveat of 
accessories and conspiracies noted below. It is also possible 
that there might be multiple counts of conviction for different 
subsections within either of these statutes.165  
• A4. This column represents sentences for convictions of all 
other obstruction statutes not listed in A1, A2, and A3, limited 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and including § 1519. It does not 
include §§ 1520–21. This column is limited just to obstruction 
statutes and does not include sentences that might have been 
given for obstructive conduct along with other criminal 
 
 164. The choice of years reported here was to replicate as close as possible the five-year 
increments seen in the prior data. The dates, however, may not coincide as the entities use 
different reporting dates for their year. 
 165. There can be multiple counts of an obstruction case premised upon different 
provisions found in § 1512. 
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offenses. If the obstruction conviction includes a multiple of 
A1, A2, and A3, it is included in this column, A4, and not 
included in A1–A3. Thus, a sentence that might have been 
given for a violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and § 1512 would 
be included in this column. Like A1–A3, however, it remains 
included here even if there are also convictions as an 
accessory or if the defendant has a conspiracy charge along 
with the obstruction count.  
• B. This column includes sentences for obstruction crimes that 
also had sentences of a “shortcut offense.” Thus, it includes 
an obstruction offense from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and 
including § 1519, but also has a conviction for perjury (18 
U.S.C. § 1621), false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), or false 
declarations (18 U.S.C. § 1623). Like A1–A4, however, it 
remains included here even if the designation includes a 
reference to accessories or has a conspiracy charge along with 
these other crimes. 
• C. This column includes sentences for an obstruction crime that 
also has sentences for key fraud statutes.166 Thus, it includes 
an obstruction offense from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and 
including § 1519, but also has a conviction for mail or wire 
fraud, or a fraud statute that is an outgrowth of one of these 
statutes.167 Like the prior columns, however, it remains 
included here even if the defendant was an accessory or has a 
conspiracy charge along with these other crimes. 
• D. This column includes sentences of obstruction that also had 
sentencing for any other criminal offense that was other than 
a “shortcut offense,” a fraud statute, or conspiracy. But if the 
obstruction statute had both a “shortcut crime” and a fraud 
statute, it would be listed in this column as it includes 
multiple charges.  
 
 166. Not included here are Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A RICO charge could have as its predicate act a fraud 
offense, such as mail or wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (providing the list of predicate acts 
for a “pattern of racketeering” under RICO). 
 167. Mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, are common 
prosecution charges as the statutes are broad and provide significant leeway for charging 
many different forms of fraudulent conduct. Additionally, fraud-related statutes have 
greatly increased with new fraud offenses for health care fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347) and 
securities and commodities fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1348). All of the fraud-related statutes that 
grow from the 1872 mail fraud statute are included in Column C. 
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• Total. The total reflects all of the cases involved in these 
designated years that included a charge based upon an 
obstruction of justice statute from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through 
and including § 1519 in its sentence. 
In producing this chart, it is noted that numbers included in 
each category omit violations premised on 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal 
statute that allows accessories to be charged as principals.168  
The chart also omits cases when there are accompanying 
conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the generic conspiracy 
statute in the federal system. Since many of these offenses are 
duplicative of the obstruction charge and use the obstruction 
charge as the underlying offense, excluding these numbers seemed 
warranted. Unlike some states, the federal system allows for 
conspiracy to be charged when the specific offense for the 
conspiracy statute is the same as the main conduct being charged.169  
In comparing the data from Figure 1 and Figure 2 supra, it is 
clear that there are a greater number of cases with obstruction 
convictions (Figure 2) than there are cases with the government’s 
designation of obstruction being the lead charge (Figure 1). It is also 
clear that there are many cases with a sole obstruction conviction 
without other offenses accompanying the obstruction charge. This 
does not necessarily mean that obstruction was the sole charge 
 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 2 states: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him 
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as  
a principal.  
18 U.S.C. § 2. The Sentencing Guidelines do allow for a reduced sentence when an 
individual plays a minimal role in the criminal activity and when a defendant is a minor 
participant in the criminal activity. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 1991). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides: 
  If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the 
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner 
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object 
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both. 
  If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the 
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not 
exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.  
18 U.S.C. § 371. It is possible to have a “conspiracy to defraud” as opposed to a 
conspiracy to commit a specific offense that might not include obstruction of justice as 
an underlying offense. Id. 
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when the accused was initially indicted, as there may be dismissed 
charges, perhaps as a result of pleas, or not guilty verdicts, that may 
have eliminated other possible conduct.   
4. Obstruction court data  
Looking directly to the courts allows for closer scrutiny of data. 
Unfortunately, however, this examination is limited to cases that 
proceeded on appeal or had a reported decision on a pre-trial 
matter. This omits all but a narrow range of cases, as the federal 
system is predominantly one of pleas, and fewer cases proceed 
through the appellate process when the conviction results from a 
plea agreement. Also, the number of cases with pre-trial issues that 
will have a reported decision are not significant. Thus, the data 
provided in Figure 3 infra is a significantly smaller number of cases 
than seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 supra. The information, however, 
about the individual cases represented on this chart is greater.  
 
Date A1 A2 A3 A4 B C D  
1994 0 0 1 2 4 0 37 
2009 2 3 10 9 7 3 119 
2014 2 2 18 9 8 3 126 
2019 0 0 9 3 6 4 92 
Figure 3: Obstruction Counts in Court Opinions170 
 
Examining specific cases as represented by the numbers in 
Figure 3, using the same categories used in compiling the data for 
Figure 2, confirms the existence of obstruction charges being 
brought without any crimes beyond obstruction of justice being 
charged. United States v. Solofa171 is an example of a prosecution 
exclusively premised on obstruction statutes. The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions in 
this case under two separate obstruction of justice statutes: witness 
tampering under § 1512(b)(3) and the generic obstruction statute 
 
 170. Although the categories in Figure 3 remain the same as those in Figure 2, a wider 
range of obstruction statutes, namely 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503–21, is used in Figure 3. The two prior 
charts also do not coincide as pre-trial data, trial data, and sentencing data may not match in 
date ranges. These differences are merely a function of the reporting dates used in compiling 
the data and the ability to observe easily the applicable statutes. 
 171. United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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under § 1503. The defendant’s claim that he did not have a corrupt 
intent was rejected at trial, and the convictions were affirmed  
on appeal.172  
Some cases present obstruction charges along with “shortcut 
offenses.” For example, in the 1994 decision of United States v. 
DeSalvo,173 one sees the classic charging of four counts of the generic 
obstruction statute found in § 1503, along with four counts of 
perjury.174 The case involved the defendant testifying three times, 
initially in front of a state grand jury, second in front of a federal 
grand jury, and finally in court. Immunity, albeit different forms 
because of the state and federal immunity laws, was provided on 
each occasion. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions noting 
that immunity did not protect a person from perjury charges.175 
Although the crux of the decision centered on the scope of 
immunity, it should be noted that the statements used in this 
prosecution were allowed for meeting both perjury and obstruction 
of justice and that beyond these false statements there was no 
further underlying conduct that was charged. 
When coupled with underlying conduct, as reported in Column 
D of Figure 3 supra, one finds a wide array of conduct 
accompanying the obstruction charge. For example, there are 
obstruction cases that also had immigration,176 money 
 
 172. Id. at 1228. The court rejected on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
premised on counsel not presenting an entrapment defense. Id. at 1230. 
 173. United States v. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d 1216 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 174. Although the court uses the term “perjury,” the case actually came under the false 
declarations statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 
 175. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d at 1220 (citing United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) 
(allowing indictment for perjury despite immunity)). 
 176. See United States v. Carriles, 263 F.R.D. 400, 401 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing a 
superseding indictment of two counts of perjury, one count of obstruction before an agency 
under § 1505, one count of naturalization fraud, and seven counts of false statement in 
naturalization proceeding). 
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laundering,177 fraud,178 tax,179 and murder charges.180 Obstruction 
crimes in these cases stand alongside the underlying conduct  
as opposed to it being the sole charge like we see in the cases  
in columns A1–A3, and some instances in column A4 of  
Figure 3 supra.   
5.  Summary analysis 
What is noteworthy here in looking at all three charts,  
Figures 1–3 supra, is that throughout the years, obstruction of justice 
has been charged as a sole offense without other charges. We also 
see obstruction of justice crimes matched with other “shortcut 
offenses.” This correlates with court matters that have found a false 
statement in a proceeding to be both perjury and a false declaration, 
in addition to being obstruction of justice.   
Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) press releases highlight the 
use of obstruction of justice as a sole offense against individuals.181 
This stance appears to be contrary to the position taken by Attorney 
General Barr in response to the Mueller Report, where he discounted 
cases brought under obstruction of justice without underlying 
conduct being charged. DOJ press releases also highlight the use of 
 
 177. See United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming convictions of a 
former attorney for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, money laundering, and conspiracy to 
commit money laundering). 
 178. See United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming the obstruction 
of justice count and conspiracy, while reversing the conviction for false registration of a 
domain name). 
 179. See United States v. Williamson, 746 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming an 
obstruction case premised on impeding due administration of Internal Revenue laws). 
 180. See United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014) (resentencing  
for convictions of obstruction under § 1512(a)(1)(C) and using a firearm for killing a  
police officer). 
 181. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Caregiver Pleads Guilty to 
Obstructing Investigation Related to Violation of Disabled Resident’s Civil Rights  
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-caregiver-pleads-guilty-
obstructing-investigation-related-violation-disabled-resident; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Massachusetts District Court Judge and Court Officer Indicted for Obstruction of 
Justice (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/massachusetts-district-court-
judge-and-court-officer-indicted-obstruction-justice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
President of Texas-Based Beverage Company Indicted for Obstruction of Justice  
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/president-texas-based-beverage-
company-indicted-obstruction-justice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., University of Kansas 
Researcher Indicted for Fraud for Failing to Disclose Conflict of Interest with Chinese 
University (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-kansas-
researcher-indicted-fraud-failing-disclose-conflict-interest-chinese. 
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obstruction of justice with other shortcut offenses.182 Likewise, 
examining other cases emanating from Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s investigation demonstrates the use of obstruction charges 
as solo offenses,183 coupled with short-cut offenses,184 and alongside 
other conduct.185 One need only look at the indictments against 
Konstantin Kilimnik, Roger Stone, and Paul Manafort, Jr., to see  
the government’s use of these approaches in obstruction of  
justice prosecutions.  
III. OBSTRUCTION AS A SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT 
A. Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 
In addition to its role as a federal criminal offense, obstruction 
of justice also has a unique role in serving as a sentencing 
enhancement. In this context, obstruction of justice is not being 
considered a crime but rather a basis for raising the accused’s 
sentence for specific obstruction conduct.   
 
 182. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Oil Tanker Owner, Operator, and Chief 
Engineer Convicted for Obstruction of Justice and Concealing Deliberate Pollution  
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-tanker-owner-operator-and-chief-
engineer-convicted-obstruction-justice-and-concealing; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Chicago Area Lawyer Indicted for Perjury and Obstructing Justice (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chicago-area-lawyer-indicted-perjury-and-obstructing-
justice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former FBI Linguist Arrested and Indicted on 
Obstruction Charges (May 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/former-fbi-
linguist-arrested-and-indicted-obstruction-charges; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Witness Indicted for False Declarations Before a Grand Jury and Obstruction of Justice  
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/witness-indicted-false-declarations-
grand-jury-and-obstruction-justice. 
 183. See Superseding Indictment at 29–30, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-201 
(D.D.C. June 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/sco/page/file/1070326/download 
(charging Kilimnik with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice). 
 184. See Indictment, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124706/download (charging obstruction of justice under 
§§ 1505 and 1512, as well as a false statement charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). On July 10, 
2020, President Trump issued an executive grant of clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. Press 
Release, White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grant of 
Clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. (July 10, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-grant-clemency-roger-stone-jr/. 
 185. See Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-201 
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1094141/download (including 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, tax fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness 
tampering), and other offenses). 
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When computing a sentence under the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines,186 a variety of 
different adjustments are considered, such as victim-related 
adjustments,187 the accused’s role in the offense,188 whether there 
are multiple counts,189 and whether the defendant accepted 
responsibility for his or her actions.190 In some instances the 
adjustments call for an increased sentence, such as when there is a 
hate crime motivation in the act.191 In other instances, such as when 
the defendant has a mitigating role in the offense or accepted 
responsibility for his or her actions, the adjustments may lower the 
sentence level that will be used in computing the sentence using the 
sentencing guidelines.192 Part C of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provides four guidelines applicable to obstruction 
conduct, all providing a basis for a court to increase a sentence level 
for the accused’s conduct. Specifically, Guideline § 3C1.1193 pertains 
to “obstructing or impeding the administration of justice.”  
As a consideration under the federal sentencing guidelines, 
“obstructing or impeding the administration of justice” provides 
for an increase in two levels on the sentencing chart if the conduct 
fulfils two components: 
[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct 
 
 186. Initially, one computes the base offense level and then determines if adjustments 
and departures are necessary. The criminal history of the offender also plays a role in 
factoring the sentence. As a result of Supreme Court decisions, the imposition of a sentence 
is determined by implementing the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. See generally Kate Stith,  
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 
(2008) (discussing the change in sentencing resulting from Supreme Court rulings). 
 187. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 188. See id. § 3B. 
 189. See id. § 3D. 
 190. See id. § 3E. 
 191. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2010). 
 192. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 193. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON, SIGMUND G. POPKO, DEBORAH YOUNG, MICHAEL P. 
O’CONNOR & CELIA M. RUMANN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1024–25 (2020 
ed.) (discussing the history of section 3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines). 
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related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any 
relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense . . . .194 
The application notes make clear that “[o]bstructive conduct that 
occurred prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense 
of conviction may be covered by this guideline if the conduct was 
purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation or 
prosecution of the offense of conviction.”195 The application 
provides a long list of conduct that may fall under this sentencing 
adjustment, specifically noting that this list is not exhaustive.196 
The sentencing guidelines application notes also provide a list 
of conduct that ordinarily would not fit the contours for an 
increased sentence under this guideline adjustment. In some 
instances, one finds conduct that may more appropriately be 
 
 194. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 195. Id. at Application Note 1. 
 196. Id. at Application Note 4. The examples are: 
(A) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, 
witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so; (B) committing, 
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil 
proceeding if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense 
of conviction; (C) producing or attempting to produce a false, altered, or 
counterfeit document or record during an official investigation or judicial 
proceeding; (D) destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person 
to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial 
proceeding (e.g., shredding a document or destroying ledgers upon learning that 
an official investigation has commenced or is about to commence), or attempting 
to do so; however, if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest (e.g., 
attempting to swallow or throw away a controlled substance), it shall not, standing 
alone, be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted in a 
material hindrance to the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense 
or the sentencing of the offender; (E) escaping or attempting to escape from 
custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a 
judicial proceeding; (F) providing materially false information to a judge or 
magistrate judge; (G) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement 
officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or 
prosecution of the instant offense; (H) providing materially false information to a 
probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court; 
(I) other conduct prohibited by obstruction of justice provisions under Title 18, 
United States Code (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510, 1511); (J) failing to comply with a 
restraining order or injunction issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) or with an 
order to repatriate property issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); (K) threatening 
the victim of the offense in an attempt to prevent the victim from reporting the 
conduct constituting the offense of conviction. 
Id. It is also stated that “[t]his adjustment also applies to any other obstructive conduct in 
respect to the official investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where 
there is a separate count of conviction for such conduct.” Id. 
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covered under other guideline sentencing provisions.197 This 
guideline’s application notes also explicitly provide an exclusion 
when the defendant is actually being sentenced for an obstruction, 
perjury, or contempt crime.198 That said, a typical obstruction 
enhancement is seen in cases when the defendant provides false or 
perjurious testimony during his or her trial,199 or when someone 
threatens a witness who testifies at the trial.  
But many issues concerning the application of an obstruction 
enhancement to a sentence remain contentious. For example, 
circuits have not ruled consistently on whether one who 
misrepresents his or her assets on a pre-trial financial affidavit in 
order to obtain appointed defense counsel would constitute 
sufficient conduct warranting a sentencing enhancement pursuant 
to § 3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines.200 Likewise, although it is 
clear that the obstruction sentencing enhancement covers 
“attempt” conduct, it remains an open question as to whether 
§ 3C1.1 covers attempt conduct when the conduct is not a 
significant obstruction of the investigation or when it occurs 
through unsworn statements.201 Obstruction as used as a 
 
 197. Id. at Application Note 5. The guidelines provide the following non-exhaustive list 
of examples that would not be considered the basis for an enhancement premised on 
obstruction conduct: 
(A) providing a false name or identification document at arrest, except where such 
conduct actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investigation or 
prosecution of the instant offense; (B) making false statements, not under oath, to 
law enforcement officers, unless Application Note 4(G) above applies; 
(C) providing incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a material 
falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation; (D) avoiding or fleeing from 
arrest (see, however, §3C1.2 (Reckless Endangerment During Flight)); (E) lying to a 
probation or pretrial services officer about defendant’s drug use while on pre-trial 
release, although such conduct may be a factor in determining whether to reduce 
the defendant’s sentence under §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). 
Id. 
 198. Id. at Application Note 7. 
 199. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 
 200. See United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2017) (joining the majority that 
this constitutes obstruction of justice for the purposes of sentencing). But see United States v. 
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 80, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that when the false statement 
only results in obtaining indigent counsel, it is not sufficient for a sentencing enhancement). 
 201. Application Note 5 to § 3C1.1 appears to exclude the making of “false statements, 
not under oath, to law enforcement officers.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C.1 
Application Note 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). But it also states that this does not apply 
when Application Note 4(G) occurs, which is when the defendant “provid[es] a materially 
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sentencing enhancement, however, does require materiality.202 The 
fact-finding process for using a sentence enhancement has also 
proved disconcerting when the accused is accepting a plea as 
opposed to going to trial.203 Finally, because the obstruction 
conduct is not being charged as a crime, the accused does not 
receive all the constitutional benefits accorded in a typical criminal 
prosecution, such as the right to “a presentment or indictment  
of a Grand Jury,”204 on the specific conduct outlined in  
the enhancement.  
It is possible, however, for obstruction to be the crime charged, 
with the case also having separate obstruction conduct being 
argued as the basis for a sentencing enhancement. For example, 
Roger J. Stone, Jr., was convicted of one count of obstructing a 
congressional investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, five counts of 
making numerous false statements to Congress under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(a)(2), and one count of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b)(1). All of these convictions resulted from his testimony of 
September 26, 2017, before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that was investigating 
“allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential 
election.”205 In the Government’s initial sentencing memorandum, 
it requested a two-level increase in the sentence premised on 
 
false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the 
official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” Id. at Application Note 4(G). 
Courts have struggled in interpreting these two provisions. See United States v. Slager,  
912 F.3d 224, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no error in having the two level sentence 
enhancement when the significant statements made to law enforcement were unsworn); 
United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (enhancement allowed for significant 
obstruction made through attempt conduct). But see United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513, 
529 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding it improper to allow enhancement for attempted obstruction 
conduct that was not proven to be significant). 
 202. See United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] lie that is 
immaterial to the justice process is not a potential interference with it.”); United States v. 
Saunders, 359 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that if the perjury was “on an immaterial 
matter, even in court, there would be no obstruction of justice”); see also Podgor, supra note 
112, at 597–98 (looking at whether materiality should be an element of obstruction of justice). 
 203. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a 
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (discussing how the sentencing enhancement 
world fails to adequately account for a criminal justice system that is predominantly pleas). 
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 205. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19-
cr-18 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2020). “[T]he House Intelligence Committee was considering Russian 
involvement in obtaining and transmitting stolen documents that were eventually released 
by WikiLeaks and any links with the Trump Campaign.” Id. at 4. 
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alleged post-indictment obstruction conduct.206 In its second 
sentencing memorandum it removed this enhancement stating that 
“the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1) 
overlaps to a degree with the offense conduct in this case.”207 Thus, 
although one had obstruction of justice as a crime, the government 
changed its position in the two sentencing memorandums from 
initially saying the obstruction conduct after the filing of the 
charges differed from the charged conduct and therefore could be 
the basis of a sentencing enhancement, to later saying it should not 
be used this way. 
B. Statistical Use of Guideline § 3C1.1 
Sentencing enhancements for obstruction conduct under 
§ 3C1.1 are not significantly used by courts in comparison to the 
total number of individuals sentenced. The chart below provides a 
sampling of the number of cases where the offender received a 
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, in comparison to 
the number of cases with no such sentencing enhancement. It also 







 206. The government argued that “[s]hortly after the case was indicted, Stone posted 
an image of the presiding judge with a crosshair next to her head.” Id. at 18. There were also 
allegations of violations of a “court order by posting messages on social media about matters 
related to the case.” Id. 
 207. Government’s Supplemental and Amended Sentencing Memorandum at 3, United 
States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2020). This new Memorandum also stated that 
“[m]oreover, it is unclear to what extent the defendant’s obstructive conduct actually 
prejudiced the government at trial.” Id. at 3–4. The filing of an amended government 
sentencing memorandum proved to be highly controversial. See Matt Zapotosky, Devlin 
Barrett, Ann E. Marimow & Spencer S. Hsu, Prosecutors Quit amid Escalating Justice Dept.  
Fight over Roger Stone’s Prison Term, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/justice-dept-to-reduce-sentencing-
recommendation-for-trump-associate-roger-stone-official-says-after-president-calls-it-
unfair/2020/02/11/ad81fd36-4cf0-11ea-bf44-f5043eb3918a_story.html. On July 10, 2020, 
President Trump issued an executive grant of clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. Press Release, 
White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grant of Clemency 
for Roger Stone, Jr. (July 10, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-grant-clemency-roger-stone-jr/. 
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Figure 4: Obstruction as a Sentencing Enhancement208 
 
Examining this chart in Figure 4, it is apparent that over time 
there has been a percentage decrease in the use of obstruction as a 
sentencing option. The change from 4.9% in 1994 to 2.1% in 2017 
demonstrates this decrease in cases where a court used the § 3C1.1 
enhancement in sentencing a convicted defendant.  
C. Contrasted with Obstruction as a Crime 
When contrasting obstruction of justice as a federal crime with 
its use as a sentencing factor, several points are important here. 
First is that although a prosecutor may argue for an obstruction 
enhancement, the probation department has an equal voice in 
offering the judge its opinion on whether the sentence should be 
increased due to obstruction conduct. Likewise, the defense is a key 
 
 208. From 1996 and thereafter the figures are a part of Table 18 of the Annual Sourcebook 
of Federal Sentencing Statistics, although the included timeframe may have differed in some 
years. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS S-44 
tbl.18 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2017/Table18.pdf; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK 
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table18.pdf;  
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2009), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
and-sourcebooks/2009/Table18_0.pdf; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2004/table18pre_0.pdf;  
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (1999), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
and-sourcebooks/1999/table18_0.pdf. Prior to 1996, the numbers are a part of the Annual 















2017 1,319 60,588 2.1 97.9 
2014 1,404 66,247 2.1 97.9 
2009 1,614 69, 405 2.3 97.7 
2004 1,469 41,115 3.4 96.6 
1999 1,666 46,354 3.5 96.5 
1994 1,681 32,961 4.9 95.1 
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player in the process and may file a sentencing memorandum as to 
why this enhancement might be inapplicable for their client.  
A judge makes the ultimate decision.  
Thus, prosecutors do not have an increased or superior role in 
the sentencing context. Unlike the government’s unique ability to 
charge a defendant with a federal crime, select the crimes to be 
prosecuted, offer plea benefits of their choosing, and dismiss counts 
of an indictment, sentencing of the defendant does not provide the 
government with this sole discretion. When it comes to sentencing 
enhancements, such as the enhancement for obstruction conduct, 
multiple players may be influential in the decision of whether to 
increase the base level of the offense.   
Second, it should be noted that obstruction as a sentencing 
enhancement is seldom a negotiating point between the 
prosecution and defense in a plea agreement. The conduct in 
question may be a function of a defendant lying on the witness 
stand or intimidating or harassing witnesses209 during the trial.210 
This is particularly true because obstruction conduct typically 
happens surrounding the trial, as opposed to being a part of the 
crime charged. Thus, this sentencing enhancement is unlikely to be 
included in the plea negotiations. This is unlike sentencing 
mitigators such as the accused’s “acceptance of responsibility,” 
where the government’s plea negotiation may offer this reduction 
in sentence as a carrot for the accused to accept the plea. As 97.4% 
of cases in the federal system are resolved via a plea agreement,211 
not having this sentencing enhancement as a part of the negotiation 
limits its role as an influencing factor. The greatest role § 3C1.1 may 
have will be in deciding whether a defendant will testify at his or 
her trial. Testifying falsely can open the defendant to this 
sentencing enhancement.  
When the obstruction conduct is encompassed within the 
crime, the prosecutor has the ability to include it as a count in the 
 
 209. It is possible that the prosecutor could add charges under §§ 1512 or 1513 of  
Title 18 for intimidating or retaliating against a witness. 
 210. The prosecutor would have the option of including this as a federal crime, but if 
the case has already started, it is more likely that the conduct will be used to increase the 
sentence as opposed to presenting it as part of the initial indictment or through a 
superseding indictment. 
 211. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 
tbl.11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table11.pdf. 
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criminal indictment against the accused. Alternatively, the 
government may amend the indictment to add obstruction 
conduct, thus removing it from being a sentencing enhancement.  
Third, it is important to note that although sentencing 
enhancements can be subject to inconsistencies, there is the 
appellate remedy available to both the convicted individual and the 
government if either party believes that the judge did not correctly 
assess the sentence. From the defense perspective, an increased 
sentence for obstruction conduct would not be lost in a selective 
prosecution claim, one with an enormous burden on the defense 
and one that is seldom successful.212 Since it is not a part of the 
charging of the crime, there is equal ability to contest a judge’s use 
of this factor in increasing or not increasing a sentence for 
obstruction conduct. Because the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
compiles extensive statistical data, transparency is provided to 
review consistency in the use of sentencing factor § 3C1.1.213   
Finally, because the government can proceed with a criminal 
charge for obstruction conduct related to the trial and avoid its 
consideration as merely a sentencing enhancement, the 
government retains discretion in how they will proceed when there 
is obstruction conduct related to the defendant. As noted, if the 
obstruction conduct occurs during the trial, it is unlikely that the 
government will file new charges against the accused. But it is 
important to note that they do have this discretion. 
IV. OBSTRUCTION AS AN ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT 
A.  Generally 
Of the twenty federal impeachments,214 only the impeachments 
of Presidents Clinton and Trump explicitly include obstruction as 
 
 212. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382–84 (1982) (placing a high burden 
on the defense to show that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by an 
improper purpose); see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and 
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001) (discussing prosecutorial discretion 
in charging). 
 213. The Sentencing Commission issues annual reports that include information 
pertaining to each guideline within the federal sentencing guidelines. 
 214. These impeachments were: William Blount (Senator), John Pickering (District 
Judge), Samuel Chase (Supreme Court Justice); James H. Peck (District Judge), West 
Humphreys (District Judge), Andrew Johnson (President), Mark Delahey (District Judge), 
 
PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/20  8:29 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:3 (2021) 
704 
 
an article of impeachment.215 Obstruction of justice was considered 
in some impeachment investigations, but these impeachments did 
not come to fruition,216 such as the investigation of President 
Richard M. Nixon who resigned prior to articles of impeachment 
being voted upon by the House of Representatives.217 Several 
judicial impeachments include allegations of perjury or false 
testimony. The articles of impeachment in these instances do not 
include explicit allegations of obstruction of justice.218 This is 
noteworthy, however, because prosecutors often charge 
 
William Belknap (Secretary of War), Charles Swayne (District Judge), Robert Archbald 
(Commerce Court Judge), George W. English (District Judge), Harold Louderback (District 
Judge), Halsted Ritter (District Judge), Harry Claiborne (District Judge), Alcee Hastings 
(District Judge), Walter Nixon (District Judge), William Jefferson Clinton (President), Samuel 
Kent (District Judge), Thomas Porteous (District Judge), Donald J. Trump (President).  
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 201–03 (2018) 
(providing an appendix of the federal impeachments up through 2010). 
 215. See infra notes 225–41. 
 216. See 3 ASHER C. HINDS, Impeachment Proceedings Not Resulting in Trial, in HINDS’ 
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 981, 981–1034 (1907), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPREC-
HINDS-V3-28.pdf. 
 217. In the case of Former President Richard Nixon, an impeachment investigation by 
the Judiciary Committee had been authorized by the House. See H.R. Res. 803,  
93d Cong. (1974), https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-resolution/803. 
The committee voted three articles of impeachment for consideration by the House, but they 
were not presented because of his resignation. Two of the three Articles could be considered 
allegations of obstructive forms of conduct. Article One included language alleging that the 
President “committed unlawful entry of the” Democratic Headquarters in using his powers 
“personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan 
designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover 
up . . . and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.” See COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 2, 4 (1974), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/ukraine-clearinghouse-house-rep.-93-1305.pdf. Nine specific 
acts are then alleged. Id. Article Three concerned the alleged refusal to produce certain 
materials to Congress. Id. 
 218. For example, the three articles of impeachment against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 
reference the making of false material statements to a grand jury and concealing information 
to the grand jury, but there are no explicit statements of this being an obstruction of justice. 
See IMPEACHMENT OF WALTER L. NIXON, JR. (1989), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ 
pkg/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3-19-6.pdf. Likewise, the four articles 
of impeachment against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., include corruption and perjury, but 
no mention of obstruction of justice. See Bruce Alpert, Judge Thomas Porteous: Summary of 4 
Articles of Impeachment Approved, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 11, 2010, 10:41 PM), 
https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_fba1b03d-0784-5e16-8e4d-
a5df7706d2fe.html. 
PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/20  8:29 PM 
705 Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut 
 705 
 
obstruction of justice in federal criminal cases based upon false 
statements,219 false declarations,220 or perjury.221 
Two impeachments were premised upon judicial use and 
alleged misuse of contempt powers, an early form of obstruction of 
justice. These impeachments involved Judge James H. Peck in 
1830,222 previously discussed as his impeachment was the impetus 
for the initial obstruction statute, and Judge Charles Swayne, a 
federal district court judge for the Northern District of Florida who 
faced impeachment in 1905.223 Both of these judges were accused of 
improperly issuing contempt orders and faced impeachment for 
this alleged judicial misconduct.224 Both were acquitted following 
their impeachment trials. In each of these cases, the alleged 
obstruction of justice was not being done by the judicial officer, but 
 
 219. See United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1524–25 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that a 
government informant had obstructed justice by making false statements to an attorney). 
 220. See United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1078 (2d Cir. 1985) (charging both false 
declarations and obstruction for false testimony to a grand jury). 
 221. See United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (charging both 
perjury and obstruction of justice for an agreement to frustrate a grand jury using “evasion, 
silence or lies”). 
 222. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 223. In several ways Judge Swayne’s case mirrors that of Judge Peck as one of the 
Articles related to his “[h]aving imprisoned and fined certain lawyers in his District and 
certain citizens therein without authority of law upon an alleged contempt proceeding.”  
E. Hilton Jackson, The Swayne Impeachment Proceedings, 10 VA. L. REG. 1071, 1072 (1905) 
(providing a summary of the articles of impeachment). The judge was alleged to have 
“negotiate[ed] with a real estate agent in” Florida for land that was in litigation in his court. 
Id. at 1075. Thereafter the two attorneys involved in the land case dismissed the suit in Judge 
Swayne’s court and began litigation in the state courts of Florida. Judge Swayne believed 
that the filing of this suit was an attempt to force him to recuse himself so that the attorneys 
could obtain a new judge. In response to the attorneys’ actions, Judge Swayne sentenced the 
two lawyers to imprisonment, a fine, and two years disbarment. The case against the 
attorneys was thereafter reversed by the Northern District of Florida. But the conduct ended 
up being a key component in this 1905 impeachment action against the judge. Id.; see also 
ASHER C. HINDS, The Impeachment and Trial of Charles Swayne, in HINDS’ PRECEDENTS supra 
note 216, at 948, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-
V3/html/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3-27.htm. The article of impeachment was considered the 
most serious of the charges and involved allegations that he imposed an “illegal and 
arbitrary” sentence on two Florida lawyers. Jackson, supra, at 1075. 
 224. In Judge Swayne’s 1905 impeachment trial it was argued that “no officer can be 
impeached except for indictable offenses, and that, as there are no common law offenses 
against the United States, it follows that there can be no impeachment except for an offense 
expressly declared and made indictable by Act of Congress.” Jackson, supra note 223, at 1077. 
The discussion, however, went on to note that this “construction would of course render the 
constitutional provision affecting impeachments a practical nullity, for Congress has defined 
and made indictable by statute comparatively few offenses.” Id. 
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rather by an attorney appearing before the judges. The judges’ 
response to the activities of these attorneys was to issue a finding 
of contempt against the lawyers. These cases, therefore, differ from 
the discussion in this Part.225  
First, the articles of impeachment do not coincide with the 
current obstruction statutes, but rather with its predecessor 
contempt offense that was initially combined with obstruction 
outside the courtroom in a unitary offense. This form of contempt 
is not currently in the federal criminal obstruction statutes, but 
instead located in a separate contempt statute that is removed from 
all the typical obstruction crimes found in chapter 73 of Title 18. 
Second, the impeachments of both Judge Peck and Judge Swayne 
do not use obstruction of justice as the basis for the impeachment, 
but rather have the contempt matter being used by them against 
another party. Thus, for purposes of this Article they are not 
considered in the comparison of impeachment premised on 
obstruction and federal criminal law obstruction crimes.  
Two of the three presidential impeachments,226 however, are 
considered here, as obstruction conduct was explicitly stated as one 
of the articles of impeachment in each of these cases.227  
 
 225. Impeachments that involve other forms of courtroom misconduct by a judicial 
officer differ from the obstruction of justice conduct being considered here. For example, a 
prior impeachment involved United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase who was 
impeached on eight articles of impeachment that focused on his courtroom conduct that was 
alleged to be “arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.” ASHER C. HINDS, The Impeachment and Trial 
of Samuel Chase, in HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 216, at 711, 722, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3/html/GPO-HPREC-
HINDS-V3-21.htm. He was acquitted following a failure to secure a 2/3 vote on any of the 
articles of impeachment. Id. at 770. 
 226. See generally JON MEACHAM, TIMOTHY NAFTALI, PETER BAKER & JEFFREY A. ENGEL, 
IMPEACHMENT: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2018) (discussing the impeachments of Andrew 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton). 
 227. In the case of Andrew Johnson, the first U.S. President to face impeachment, the 
eleven articles of impeachment alleged conduct that might today fit under an obstruction of 
justice statute. But he was not charged at that time with statements of obstructing the due 
administration of justice. Yet, allegations of intimidation, as noted below, would fit current 
obstructive activities. For example, Article IV of Articles of Impeachment against President 
Andrew Johnson was: 
That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high 
duties of his office and of his oath of office, in violation of the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our 
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District 
of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other 
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The impeachments of Presidents William Jefferson Clinton and 
Donald J. Trump both included obstruction of justice in the articles 
of impeachment.228 As with many of the other impeachment trials 
in the history of the United States, both also resulted in  
an acquittal.229  
As one might suspect, many issues surround impeachments,230 
especially presidential impeachments. These include what 
constitutes a “high crime and misdemeanor,”231 whether a criminal 
act is required,232 whether presidential immunity precludes the 
 
persons to the House of Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation 
and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there 
Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of the United 
States, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, contrary 
to and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the provisions 
of an act entitled “An act to define and punish certain conspiracies,” approved July 
thirty-first, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, whereby said Andrew Johnson, 
President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high 
crime in office. 
Article IV, The Articles of Impeachment, Andrew Johnson–National Historic Site Tennessee, NAT’L 
PARK SERV. (Mar. 7, 1868), https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/historyculture/the-articles-
of-impeachment.htm. 
 228. See IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 105-830 (1998), https://www.congress.gov/105/crpt/hrpt830/CRPT-
105hrpt830.pdf; Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong., at 6 (2019) (enacted), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6572344-Articles-of-Impeachment-
1.html#document/p1. 
 229. William Clinton was acquitted on February 12, 1999. President Bill Clinton Acquitted 
on Both Articles of Impeachment, HISTORY (Feb. 9, 2010), https://www.history.com/this-day-
in-history/president-clinton-acquitted. Donald Trump was acquitted on February 5, 2020. 
Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial,  
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/ 
impeachment-vote.html. 
 230. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017) 
(discussing a historical overview of impeachment and the many accompanying issues);  
see also GERHARDT, supra note 214 (discussing a wide array of background on the procedures 
and issues arising in impeachment cases). 
 231. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic 
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1999) (discussing what constitutes a “high crime and 
misdemeanor” for purposes of impeachment). 
 232. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. & PHILIP BOBBITT, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 107–09 
(2018) (noting that it is a fallacy to claim that a criminal act is required for a presidential 
impeachment). The authors use as one of their examples of why a crime is not a necessary 
component of an impeachment—“[w]hat if the president required that all cabinet members 
affirm their belief in the divinity of Christ?” Id. at 108–09; see also MAJORITY STAFF  
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS  
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impeachment of a president for presidential office–related 
activities,233 the applicable standards to be used for a conviction of 
an impeachment, and whether exhaustion of all remedies is 
necessary prior to proceeding with an obstruction allegation. 
Although these issues are significant to impeachment matters, they 
are for the most part beyond this discussion.234  
This next Section looks at obstruction of justice as alleged in the 
articles of impeachment and trials of Presidents Clinton and 
Trump. Following these two subsections, the Article specifically 
examines the structural differences between obstruction of justice 
used as the basis for an impeachment and its use as a federal 
criminal offense or as a sentencing enhancement. It is the contrast 
to the federal crime and sentencing enhancement that is the crux of 
this next Section. Thus, this discussion examines obstruction 
conduct for purposes of impeachment from the perspective of the 
obstructive acts used as charges for impeachment and the process 
in evaluating this specific conduct.  
B. Obstruction as an Article of Impeachment 
1.  President William Jefferson Clinton 
The events leading up to the impeachment of President Bill 
Clinton concerned his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, 
a White House intern, which came to light during a civil lawsuit 
filed against him during his presidency. Paula Jones, who had been 
 
FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/hcm%20final%20v.3.pdf. But recently in 
the Senate hearing on the impeachment of Donald J. Trump, Professor Alan Dershowitz 
argued that “criminal-like conduct akin to treason and bribery” was a necessary component 
for a guilty finding of impeachment. Alan Dershowitz Defense Argument Transcript: Trump 
Impeachment Trial January 27, REV: BLOG, at 15:27 (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/alan-dershowitz-defense-argument-transcript-
trump-impeachment-trial-january-27. 
 233. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018) (discussing the need to consider how “criminal law can be 
harmonized with the president’s constitutional responsibilities”); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  
169 (2000) (looking at how the legislature in impeachment hearings is making  
constitutional decisions). 
 234. See Roman et al., supra note 139, at 37–46 (discussing the conclusion of Robert 
Mueller, the Department of Justice, and others on whether a sitting President can be 
criminally indicted). 
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an employee of the Arkansas Development Commission and had 
worked for Clinton when he was governor, filed a sexual 
harassment lawsuit against him.235 Clinton’s attempt to claim 
immunity during his presidency was rejected by the Supreme 
Court,236 with the Court holding that the doctrine of separation of 
powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions 
against the President until he leaves office. On remand to the 
Arkansas District Court, the court states, “What began as a civil 
lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual 
harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of  
the President.”237 
Although there are mountains of materials that provide the 
details of the matter, a synopsis would include that the lawyers for 
Paula Jones, learning of a relationship between President Clinton 
and Monica Lewinsky, questioned him on this conduct during his 
deposition.238 In August 1998, the President also appeared before a 
grand jury as part of an Office of Independent Counsel (Starr) 
Investigation, an investigation that had expanded to cover conduct 
well beyond its initial scope.239 The net result was that Kenneth W. 
Starr, Independent Counsel, eventually referred the matter to the 
House of Representatives with a listing of eleven possible “[a]cts 
[t]hat [m]ay [c]onstitute [g]rounds for an [i]mpeachment.”240   
 
 235. GERHARDT, supra note 214, at 35. 
 236. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 681–82 (1997). One of the arguments raised by 
Clinton was “that this particular case—as well as the potential additional litigation that an 
affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn—may impose an unacceptable 
burden on the President’s time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of 
his office.” Id. at 701–02. The Court also rejected his argument regarding separation of 
powers. Id. at 705–06. 
 237. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
 238. Id. at 1121–22 (discussing the extensiveness of the questioning and his responses). 
 239. See id. at 1123. 
 240. COMMUNICATION FROM KENNETH W. STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,  
H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 129 (1998), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-
105hdoc310/pdf/CDOC-105hdoc310.pdf. The conclusion of Starr’s Report stated: 
In this case, the President made and caused to be made false statements to the 
American people about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He also made false 
statements about whether he had lied under oath or otherwise obstructed justice 
in his civil case. By publicly and emphatically stating in January 1998 that ‘‘I did 
not have sexual relations with that woman’’ and these ‘‘allegations are false,’’ the 
President also effectively delayed a possible congressional inquiry, and then he 
further delayed it by asserting Executive Privilege and refusing to testify for six 
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The U.S. House of Representatives considered four articles of 
impeachment with eventually two articles being transmitted to the 
Senate for trial.241 The two articles approved by the House alleged 
that the President “provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury regarding the Paula Jones case and his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky,” and that he “obstructed 
justice in an effort to delay, impede, cover up and conceal the 
existence of evidence related to the Jones case.”242 The specific 
conduct that was the essence of the obstruction article was 
described as “[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to file a false affidavit,” 
“[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to give false testimony if called to 
appear,” “[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to hide gifts,” “[g]etting 
Lewinsky a job to ensure her silence,” “[l]etting [Robert S. Bennett, 
Clinton’s attorney,] make false and misleading statements,” 
“[t]ampering with the testimony of Currie, a potential witness,” 
and “[l]ying to aides about his relationship with Lewinsky when he 
knew they were potential grand jury witnesses who would repeat 
the falsehoods before the grand jury.”243 Following a five-week trial 
in the Senate, President Clinton was acquitted of both articles  
of impeachment.244 
2.  President Donald J. Trump 
The trajectory of the Trump Impeachment differs in large part 
from the Clinton Impeachment because the acts of impeachment 
were not items transmitted to the U.S. House of Representatives 
from the Mueller Investigation. On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein issued an order appointing a special 
 
months during the Independent Counsel investigation. This represents substantial 
and credible information that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. 
Id. at 210. 
 241. The House Committee on the Judiciary Report had four articles of impeachment. 
See IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, supra note 228. 
 242. See Approved Articles of Impeachment, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm. 
 243. Ruth Marcus, The Articles Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles121898.htm. 
 244. President Bill Clinton Acquitted on Both Articles of Impeachment, supra note 229.  
A transcript of the hearing on Article III demonstrates that witness tampering, false 
statements, and a false affidavit were the heart of the testimony and discussion. See Federal 
News Service, The Impeachment Hearings: Dec. 11: Debate and Vote on Article III,  
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/ 
clinton/stories/articleiii121198.htm. 
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counsel to investigate Russian interference with the 2016 
Presidential election.245 Indictments and convictions against a host 
of different individuals, many associated with the President, were 
an outgrowth of the Mueller Investigation.246 The Mueller Report, 
however, did not serve as the basis of the impeachment of President 
Trump, although information from the Report was used by the 
House Managers during the Impeachment trial.247  
The impeachment of President Donald J. Trump revolved 
around whether he had solicited foreign assistance from the 
Ukrainian government to secure information about one of his 
political rivals in the upcoming election, including his withholding 
aid to this country. The House Investigation included testimony 
from some key members from the State Department, a 
whistleblower complaint that offered inside information 
concerning a telephone call between President Trump and 
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, and other information 
provided during a variety of congressional hearings.248  
Two articles of impeachment against President Trump were the 
eventual result of the House consideration of ongoing matters. 
Article I focused on allegations that the President abused his power. 
It is Article II that contains alleged obstruction conduct in charging 
him with obstruction of Congress for “blocking testimony and 
refusing to provide documents in response to House subpoenas in 
the impeachment inquiry.”249 At the Senate trial there were issues 
 
 245. Appointment of Special Counsel, DEP’T OF JUST. (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel. 
 246. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124706/download; Plea Agreement, United States v. Cohen, 
No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1115566/download. 
 247. See MUELLER REPORT VOL. I, supra note 142; MUELLER REPORT VOL. II,  
supra note 65; Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States,  
for high crimes and misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/755/text. 
 248. Read the Articles of Impeachment Against President Trump, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/10/us/politics/articles-impeachment-
document-pdf.html. 
 249. Id. Article II explicitly states that 
without lawful cause or excuse, President Trump directed Executive Branch 
agencies, offices, and officials not to comply with those subpoenas. President 
Trump thus interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas 
of the House of Representatives, and assumed to himself functions and judgments 
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raised, including whether there was a quid pro quo, whether a 
criminal act was required for an impeachment conviction, whether 
the president had done anything improper,250 and whether the 
impeachment was brought with a political motive. One of the key 
points in the Senate trial was whether additional witnesses could 
be called, most notably the former National Security Advisor John 
Bolton,251 and whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain an 
impeachment conviction. The House managers lost both issues  
and the impeachment trial ended with an acquittal for  
President Trump.252  
C. Contrasted with Obstruction as a Crime  
and Sentencing Enhancement 
In looking at how impeachment premised on obstruction differs 
from obstruction as a federal crime and as a sentencing 
enhancement, the most obvious differences rest in the procedure 
being used to proceed with the charges, the ability of parties to 
present comparable evidence as one would at a criminal trial, and 
the constituencies that review the evidence. Less clear is the 
standard of proof needed for an impeachment. Conduct that  
might fit a specific criminal statute might prove insufficient for 
conviction in an impeachment matter. Some may claim that the 
political context for consideration of impeachment charges is a 
crucial difference.  
Unlike federal statutes that outline the basis for criminal 
charges, or Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1, which provides an 
enhancement for obstruction conduct, the source for impeachment 
is the U.S. Constitution, which has four provisions related to 
 
necessary to the exercise of the “sole Power of Impeachment” vested by the 
Constitution in the House of Representatives. 
Impeaching Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755. This Article of Impeachment then provides 
the specific acts that are claimed as an abuse of President Trump’s “powers in the  
high office.” Id. 
 250. See Molly O’Toole, Trump’s Impeachment Counteroffensive Undercut by Bolton Report 
Bolstering Call for Witnesses, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020, 7:23 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-01-26/whos-on-trial-trumps-defense-team-
turns-impeachment-into-counteroffensive. 
 251. See Li Zhou, Trump’s Defense in the Impeachment Trial Just Wrapped. Here Are 6 Key 
Moments, VOX (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/ 
28/21110795/trump-defense-impeachment-trial-ken-starr-alan-dershowitz. 
 252. Baker, supra note 229. 
PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/20  8:29 PM 
713 Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut 
 713 
 
impeachment.253 The process with House Managers from the 
House of Representatives, who then present the case for trial in the 
Senate, does not come with Federal Rules of Procedure and instead 
is governed only by agreements of the parties based upon prior 
impeachments.254 Unlike courts, which have precedent to rely on, 
impeachment procedure is fluid and not binding in large part 
because the constitutional language provides only a high-level 
overview of the process, and impeachment proceedings are few 
and far between. There can be strong disagreements, such as most 
recently seen in the impeachment trial against President Trump 
when the Senate voted not to hear witnesses that the trial managers 
wanted to present.255 
It has continually been noted that a violation of a criminal 
statute is not imperative for an impeachment conviction. Although 
Alan Dershowitz, in the recent impeachment of President Trump, 
argued otherwise with regard to the first Article of Impeachment, 
which was premised on “abuse of power,” the long-standing 
position has been that a President can commit “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors” without violating the criminal law.256 That said, in 
 
 253. One finds the following constitutional provisions related to impeachment: The 
Constitution states that “[t]he House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other 
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. It also 
states that: 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for 
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the 
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be 
convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and 
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. 
Id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6–7. Article II, § 2 provides that “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to 
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Finally, Article II, § 4 states that “[t]he President, Vice 
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. Id. art. II, § 4. 
 254. See DOUG COLLINS, MODERN PRECEDENT ON IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE: 
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS FOR PRESIDENTS RICHARD NIXON AND BILL CLINTON (2019), 
https://conaway.house.gov/uploadedfiles/modern_precedent_on_impeachment_proced
ure_-_ranking_member_report.pdf. 
 255. See Zhou, supra note 251. 
 256. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1 (2019). 
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both the Impeachments of Presidents Clinton and Trump, there 
were existing federal obstruction crimes that easily could be 
matched with the charges against them. In the case of President 
Clinton, claims that he “obstructed justice in an effort to delay, 
impede, cover up and conceal the existence of evidence related to 
the Jones case”257 would merit consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 
Likewise, claims of perjury could also be prosecuted under this 
statute. In the Impeachment of President Trump, Article II’s claims 
that he obstructed Congress for “blocking testimony and refusing 
to provide documents in response to House subpoenas in the 
impeachment inquiry,”258 would fit consideration under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1505, “[o]bstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, 
and committees.” Clearly there would be defenses that can be 
associated with each of these criminal statutes, but the wording of 
the Articles of Impeachment correlate to these federal statutes. The 
acquittals in both cases do not negate whether the language in the 
Articles of Impeachment correlate to obstruction statutes in the 
federal system.   
The Impeachment process, despite resting on obstruction-
related conduct in some cases, is very different from that of a 
criminal process that affords a codified scheme for witness 
testimony, a somewhat clearer base for finding criminality, and an 
appellate process for review. Arguably one can say that 
impeachments carry a review by the electorate in future 
presidential, House, and Senate elections, but this is limited to 
impeachments of elected officials who have upcoming elections. 
Although outside the legal structure and hardly a typical appellate 
process, elections provide a reaction to an impeachment result, 
 
 257. See Approved Articles of Impeachment, supra note 235. 
 258. See Read the Articles of Impeachment Against President Trump, supra note 248. Article 
II explicitly states that 
without lawful cause or excuse, President Trump directed Executive Branch 
agencies, offices, and officials not to comply with those subpoenas. President 
Trump thus interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas 
of the House of Representatives, and assumed to himself functions and 
judgements necessary to the exercise of the “sole Power of Impeachment” vested 
by the Constitution in the House of Representatives. 
Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes and 
misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted). 
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albeit not necessarily focused on the alleged conduct that was the 
subject of review in the impeachment process.259  
CONCLUSION  
It is likely that overcriminalization and overfederalization have 
played a role in providing increased discretion to prosecutors to 
proceed against obstruction conduct.260 What was initially one 
federal statute has become an array of different obstruction statutes 
allowing prosecutors flexibility in their charging practices. 
Professor John F. Decker has written on ways to “[r]estrict[]  
the [b]oundaries” of what will constitute obstruction of justice,  
such as requiring an increased intent or limiting the range of 
conduct.261 The focus here is not on curtailing the legislation or  
its interpretation by courts, although these remedies would  
certainly assist. Rather, what is considered here is how to  
achieve a fair and just system that provides consistency and  
thus predictability.  
One has to ask whether discretion should be in the hands of a 
sole individual. Should Attorney General Barr read the Mueller 
Report and be able to conclude that the conduct alleged in the report 
should not be charged as obstruction?262 Does the fact that his office 
charges obstruction of justice without underlying conduct in other 
cases demonstrate a contradiction? Even after his pronouncement 
following the Mueller Report, his office continued to charge 
obstruction of justice as an exclusive charge.263  
 
 259. This, of course, would be inapplicable for judicial impeachments, where the judge 
may continue a lifetime appointment if he or she is not convicted in the impeachment trial. 
 260. See Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the 
Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N OF  
CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (2010), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/8d5312e0-70f8-4007-8435-
0ab703dabda9/without-intent-how-congress-is-eroding-the-criminal-intent-requirement-
in-federal-law.pdf (discussing the increased number of statutes and how many of these 
statutes have no or a low mens rea); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (discussing the political economy of criminal law). 
 261. Decker, supra note 5, at 128–29. 
 262. In his statements, Attorney General Barr did say that this was not only his decision 
but the decision of prior Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. See Barr, supra note 151, 
reprinted in ELLEN S. PODGOR, KATRICE BRIDGES COPELAND, MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR., 
RUTHANN ROBSON, LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, ANDREW M. WRIGHT & ELLEN C. YAROSHEFSKY, THE 
MUELLER INVESTIGATION AND BEYOND 16 (2020). 
 263. See United States v. Williamson, 746 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming an 
obstruction case premised on impeding due administration of Internal Revenue laws). 
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Confining prosecutorial discretion is difficult.264 One can 
educate prosecutors,265 confine statutes, readjust federal rules of 
evidence, and provide closer judicial oversight to achieve reform. 
For example, the Supreme Court rejected prosecutors using a 
Sarbanes-Oxley statute pertaining to document destruction as a 
basis for charging obstruction of justice against a Florida fisherman 
for throwing overboard undersized fish that he was told to bring 
back to shore.266 But the Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
government’s use of an obstruction charge against fisherman John 
Yates did not alleviate the collateral consequences he suffered of 
having his fishing business decimated by the government’s 
stretching of this obstruction statute.  
Government oversight prior to indictment provided in cases 
involving lawyers,267 international matters, and other high-profile 
individuals268 is not provided in typical street crime cases. 
Charging decisions in cases that are not front-pagers may be a 
single decision of a prosecutor who may be influenced by extensive 
dollars spent by law enforcement in investigating the case that he 
or she feels the need to placate the investigators’ time, effort, and 
expense. And even with the use of Department of Justice 
Guidelines, their flexibility and status as mere guidance precludes 
them from offering consistency, as they are unenforceable at law.269  
As profoundly noted by Professor Angela Davis, at a minimum, 
reform should achieve goals of “(1) the elimination of the arbitrary 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and (2) the establishment of 
initiatives to strengthen the current mechanisms of prosecutorial 
accountability.”270 Achieving these goals is possible here.   
 
 264. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social 
Meaning, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515 (2009) (discussing prosecutorial power with process crimes). 
 265. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in 
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) (calling for increased education for 
prosecutors in their discretionary decision-making role). 
 266. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015). 
 267. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-2.032 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-
9-2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.400. 
 268. See id. § 9-2.400. In the cases with international implications, the oversight is often 
to avoid international ramifications. 
 269. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing 
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2004) (discussing the non-
enforceability of Department of Justice internal guidelines). 
 270. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 180. 
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Suggested here is that transparency can offer better 
accountability.271 More data is needed to fully consider the charging 
practices in the obstruction of justice realm. The data available in 
the sentencing realm needs to be replicated in the charging arena. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s data provides the number of 
cases having the lead charge for each obstruction of justice statute. 
 It also provides the sentence on each of these cases. But it fails 
to provide the charging numbers as well as the pre-indictment 
bargaining numbers that may have occurred in determining 
whether obstruction of justice would be charged or not.  
Data transparency will also offer defense counsel with a wider 
range of arguments against charges that are outside the norms in 
the practice. It allows those in a smaller U.S. Attorney’s Office, like 
Wyoming, the ability to compare what is happening in their locale 
with situations in New York or Washington, D.C. Consistency can 
be enhanced with increased data compilation. It also allows courts 
to offer better oversight and accountability272 when considering 
pre-trial motions and sentencing recommendations.  
This data can also be influential in the impeachment world. It 
will allow consideration of whether there were criminal cases 
indicted for alleged lies in a civil action or claimed stonewalling of 
congressional subpoenas, the basis for the Clinton and Trump 
Impeachments. Data that reflects this information, data that is not 
quickly pulled together by the press to discuss actual charges, 
offers the public the ability to properly assess government actions.   
Obstruction of justice is an important crime in that it  
rests at the heart of our administration of justice. Haphazard  
results in prosecutions, sentencings, and impeachments foster 




 271. See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010) (discussing 
the flaws with secrecy); Louis J. Virelli III & Ellen S. Podgor, Secret Policies, 2019 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 463 (2019) (noting how accountability is at the heart of legitimacy); PROSECUTORS AND 
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) 
(providing comparative essays on prosecutorial accountability). 
 272. See generally Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016) (discussing the need for prosecutorial accountability to correct 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 273. Virelli & Podgor, supra note 271, at 503. 
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